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ARTICLES
RETIRING FORUM NON CONVENIENS
MAGGIE GARDNER*
When it comes to transnational litigation in the federal courts, it is time to retire the
doctrine of forum non conveniens. The doctrine, which allows judges to decline
jurisdiction in cases they believe would be better heard in foreign courts, is meant o
promote international comity and protect defendant fairness. But it was never well
designed for the former purpose, and given recent developments at the Supreme
Court, it is dangerously redundant when it comes to the latter. This Article seeks to
demythologize forum non conveniens, to question its continuing relevance, and to
encourage the courts and Congress to narrow its scope of application so that, when
the time is right, it may be fully interred.
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INTRODUCTION
When it comes to transnational litigation in the federal courts, it
is time to retire the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Forum non
conveniens allows judges to dismiss, on a discretionary basis, cases
they believe would be better heard by another country's courts.1 In
transnational cases (or cases involving foreign parties, foreign harms,
or foreign law), it is thought to further international comity and pro-
tect defendant fairness. But it is not well suited for the former pur-
pose,2 and given recent developments at the Supreme Court, it is
dangerously redundant when it comes to the latter.3 This Article aims
to demythologize forum non conveniens as a tool for managing trans-
national litigation and to encourage the courts and Congress to
narrow its scope of application so that, when the time is right, it may
be fully interred.
4
How to manage transnational litigation efficiently and fairly is a
pressing concern for the federal courts.5 Given the modern global
economy, a growing number of cases will have transnational elements;
there are already thousands of cases filed under the federal courts'
alienage jurisdiction every year.6 Indeed, a global economy depends
on the ability of individuals and companies to access courts, whether
1 Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malay. Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 425 (2007).
2 See infra Section II.B.
3 See infra Part III.
4 On possible routes to retirement, see infra Part IV.
5 Cf STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD: AMERICAN LAW AND THE
NEW GLOBAL REALITIES 4 (2015) (arguing that, given "an ever more interdependent
world-a world of instant communications and commerce, and shared problems of (for
example) security, the environment, health, and trade, all of which ever more pervasively
link individuals without regard to national boundaries . . . , it has become clear that, even in
ordinary matters, judicial awareness can no longer stop at the border").
6 See Donald Earl Childress III, Rethinking Legal Globalization: The Case of
Transnational Personal Jurisdiction, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489, 1495 (2013) (noting
roughly 120,000 alienage cases had been filed in federal courts since 1986); cf. Christopher
A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 481, 510, 515-16
(2011) (noting that alienage jurisdiction cases may be declining, but that transnational
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here or in other countries, in order to resolve the cross-border dis-
putes that will inevitably arise.7 This is not a new concern. The rules of
private international law developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries precisely to help those engaged in international commerce
enforce their rights outside their home jurisdictions.8 This system of
private international law depended largely on comity, or the willing-
ness of courts in one country to recognize the laws, citizens, and inter-
ests of another country on the understanding that the foreign
country's courts would provide the same recognition in turn.9 Comity,
in other words, is rooted in reciprocity.
Yet comity is not itself a doctrine; it is instead a complex value
that may point in different directions depending on the context. To
understand the role of forum non conveniens as a comity doctrine
requires disentangling these different notions of comity. As Professor
William Dodge has recently shown, doctrines meant to further comity
can be categorized along two different dimensions.10 Along one
dimension are different types of foreign government power that a
court may want to accommodate: Prescriptive comity doctrines
manage the overlap in states' power to establish laws and regulate
behavior, while adjudicative comity doctrines speak to which sover-
eign should resolve a particular dispute."1 Along the other dimension,
there is the method by which a court might pursue comity: Negative
litigation also arises under federal question, admiralty, bankruptcy, or general diversity
jurisdiction).
7 See, e.g., Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L.
REV. 429, 506 (2003) (noting that international trade requires "a functioning system for
cooperative resolution of disputes across borders" that nonetheless allows "each nation to
protect its national, democratically determined interests").
8 See, e.g., Donald Earl Childress III, Comity as Conflict: Resituating International
Comity as Conflict of Laws, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 11, 17-43 (2010) (describing the origins
and evolution of comity as the foundation for private international law); see also id. at 14
("In that comity helps maintain amicable working relationships between nations, it
facilitates the transnational exchange of peoples, services, and goods, and supports private
and international interests.").
9 Comity is a notoriously slippery term. See, e.g., Joel R. Paul, Comity in International
Law, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 3-4 (1991); Michael D. Ramsey, Escaping "International
Comity," 83 IOWA L. REV. 893, 893 (1998); see also N. Jansen Calamita, Rethinking
Comity: Towards a Coherent Treatment of International Parallel Proceedings, 27 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 601, 605 n.7 (2006) (gathering criticisms of the vagueness of the concept of
"comity"). For a recent, admirable effort to clarify the concept of comity, see William S.
Dodge, International Comity in American Law, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2078 (2015)
(defining comity as "deference to foreign government actors that is not required by
international law but is incorporated in domestic law").
10 Dodge, supra note 9, at 2078-79.
11 Though I draw heavily on Dodge's careful synthesis of comity in U.S. law, I fold his
category of "sovereign party comity" (encompassing the privilege of sovereigns to bring
suit, foreign state immunity, and foreign official immunity) into adjudicative comity. See id.
at 2079 tbl.1.
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comity doctrines call for restraint on the part of courts to avoid step-
ping on the toes of foreign states, while positive comity doctrines call
on courts to step temporarily into the shoes of foreign sovereigns to
protect those sovereigns' interests.12 Negative comity informs, for
example, immunity and abstention doctrines, while positive comity
underlies choice of law and the enforcement of foreign judgments.
When people speak of forum non conveniens as a comity doc-
trine, they usually have in mind negative adjudicative comity-of
restraining the U.S. court's exercise of jurisdiction to avoid infringing
on the judicial interests of another country.13 From this perspective,
dismissals for forum non conveniens are meant to demonstrate respect
for foreign legal systems. But such dismissals can run counter to posi-
tive comity commitments as well: either the positive adjudicative
comity commitment to allow foreigners access to U.S. courts,14 or the
positive prescriptive comity commitment to apply foreign law when
appropriate.
Too little sensitivity to these positive comity commitments in
transnational litigation can undermine reciprocity between countries,
which in turn jeopardizes the interests of private parties.1 5 Consider,
12 Dodge divides comity doctrines along this dimension into the "principle of
recognition" and the "principle of restraint." Id. at 2078-79, 2079 tbl.1.
13 See, e.g., Reid-Walen v. Hansen, 933 F.2d 1390, 1403 (8th Cir. 1991) (Timbers, J.,
dissenting) ("American courts' continuing refusal to dismiss when events so warrant is
based on our paternalistic attitude toward United States citizens and our condescending
view of foreign courts."); see also Dodge, supra note 9, at 2109-10.
14 See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004) ("The courts of the United States
have traditionally been open to nonresident aliens."); Disconto Gesellschaft v. Umbreit,
208 U.S. 570, 578 (1908) ("Alien citizens, by the policy and practice of the courts of this
country, are ordinarily permitted to resort to the courts for the redress of wrongs and the
protection of their rights."); GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL
CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 366 (5th ed. 2011) ("It was long settled that
neither foreign citizens nor foreign residents were barred from access to U.S. courts,
including in actions arising abroad under foreign law. This rule rested on principles of
international law, and was uniformly acknowledged by commentators."); Annotation,
Power of Court, in Exercise of Discretion, to Refuse to Entertain Action for Non-statutory
Tort Occurring in Another State or Country, 32 A.L.R. 6, 8 (1924) (observing that "the
courts have generally accorded to alien friends the same privileges of suit as they have
extended to citizens or subjects of the forum," not as a matter of right, but as a matter of
comity).
15 Cf Hannah L. Buxbaum, Foreign Governments as Plaintiffs in U.S. Courts and the
Case Against "Judicial Imperialism," 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 653, 656-58 (2016)
(warning against overemphasizing negative comity concerns at the expense of
acknowledging positive comity commitments). Commentators have thus argued that the
greater comity risk with forum non conveniens comes not from the retention of
transnational cases, but from the dismissal of cases involving U.S. defendants and foreign
plaintiffs in particular. See, e.g., Elizabeth T. Lear, National Interests, Foreign Injuries, and
Federal Forum Non Conveniens, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 559, 563 (2007); Christopher A.
Whytock & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens and the Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1444, 1491-92 (2011). Similar arguments have
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for example, the DBCP litigation: In the 1990s, farm workers from a
dozen developing countries attempted to sue Dow Chemical Com-
pany and other U.S. defendants in U.S. courts for cancers and infer-
tility that they alleged were caused by their exposure to
dibromochloropropane (DBCP), a chemical whose use in pesticides
was banned in the United States in 1977 but that Dow and others
continued to manufacture for export.16 When a federal court dis-
missed those cases for forum non conveniens,17 the plaintiffs' home
countries viewed those dismissals not as an expression of comity, but
rather as an expression of protectionism.18 When Costa Rican plain-
tiffs refiled suit against Dow in a Costa Rican court, for example, a
judge dismissed the claims on the basis that the U.S. court had had
proper jurisdiction over the case and was thus obliged to hear it.19
Other Latin American countries adopted laws to express similar con-
cerns.20 In particular, Nicaragua adopted retaliatory legislation that
specifically targeted DBCP claims, making liability easier for plaintiffs
been raised against the overapplication of other negative comity doctrines, particularly the
presumption against extraterritoriality. See, e.g., RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136
S. Ct. 2090, 2115-16 (2016) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part and
from the judgment) ("Making such litigation available to domestic but not foreign
plaintiffs is hardly solicitous of international comity or respectful of foreign interests.");
Maggie Gardner, Essay, RJR Nabisco and the Runaway Canon, 102 VA. L. REV. ONLINE
134, 144 & n.75 (2016) (noting that overuse of the presumption against extraterritoriality
can cause positive comity problems and gathering sources raising similar concerns).
16 Walter W. Heiser, Forum Non Conveniens and Retaliatory Legislation: The Impact
on the Available Alternative Forum Inquiry and on the Desirability of Forum Non
Conveniens as a Defense Tactic, 56 KAN. L. REV. 609, 620 (2008).
17 Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 890 F. Supp. 1324, 1373 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
18 See Henry Saint Dahl, Forum Non Conveniens, Latin America and Blocking Statutes,
35 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 21, 26-27 (2003-2004) (describing the perception in Latin
America that forum non conveniens is "a type of 'blocking statute"' that contravenes
plaintiff's right to bring suit in defendant's domicile).
19 See Dante Figueroa, Conflicts of Jurisdiction Between the United States and Latin
America in the Context of Forum Non Conveniens Dismissals, 37 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L.
REV. 119, 155-56 (2005). Indeed, forum non coveniens may be at odds in particular types
of cases with existing treaty commitments to provide a forum to other countries' citizens.
See Int'l Arbitration Club of N.Y., Application of the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens
in Summary Proceedings for the Recognition and Enforcement of Awards Governed by the
New York and Panama Conventions, 24 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 1, 20-22 (2013) (expressing
concern about compliance with the New York Convention); Peter B. Rutledge, With
Apologies to Paxton Blair, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1063, 1079 (2013) (same); cf.
Melinda R. Lewis, The "Lawfare" of Forum Non Conveniens: Suits by Foreigners in U.S.
Courts for Air Accidents Occurring Abroad, 78 J. AIR L. & COM. 319, 329-33 (2013)
(describing disagreements among courts over the permissibility of forum non conveniens
dismissals under the Warsaw Convention).
20 See, e.g., Ronald A. Brand, Challenges to Forum Non Conveniens, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 1003, 1020-21 & nn.56-59 (2013) (surveying responses); Figueroa, supra note 19,
at 156-59 (surveying Latin American "blocking statutes" and suggesting that they have
"contributed to aggravate the current [forum non conveniens] impasse").
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to establish in Nicaraguan courts while imposing onerous burdens on
defendants and instituting U.S.-sized damages awards.21 This law led
to over $2 billion in judgments against Dow from Nicaraguan courts
alone, the enforcement of which Dow has since fought to block in U.S.
courts.
2 2
Such examples have provided new fuel to an already extensive
literature criticizing forum non conveniens.23 Three strands of critique
stand out. First, based on cases like the DBCP litigation, scholars have
argued that forum non conveniens dismissals are unfair to plaintiffs
and cause other countries to retaliate, hurting defendants and long-
term U.S. interests as well.24 This strand of criticism encompasses
access-to-justice concerns: Even if plaintiffs are not barred by retalia-
tory legislation from refiling their case in the foreign forum, the prac-
tical effect of a forum non conveniens dismissal may be the same,
given the cost and difficulty of starting over in a distant court.25 And
even when plaintiffs do succeed in relitigating the case in a foreign
forum, defendants may find their fair trial rights compromised, as in
the DBCP litigation-which means successful plaintiffs may nonethe-
less experience an "enforcement gap" when U.S. courts prove
unwilling to enforce the resulting foreign judgments.
26
Second, scholars and judges alike have critiqued the doctrine for
its poor design and overbroad discretion, the combination of which
provides too little guidance for judges and thus too little predictability
for parties. As Justice Black foresaw when the Supreme Court first
21 See Figueroa, supra note 19, at 158-59; Heiser, supra note 16, at 631-32.
22 See Pamela K. Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1081, 1083
(2015); see also Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1352 (S.D. Fla. 2009)
(refusing to enforce Nicaraguan DBCP judgment).
23 For some highlights of the critical literature on forum non conveniens, see generally
MICHAEL KARAYANNI, FORUM NON CONVENIENS IN THE MODERN AGE (2004); Bookman,
supra note 22; Kevin M. Clermont, The Story of Piper: Forum Matters, in CIVIL
PROCEDURE STORIES 199 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2d ed. 2008); Martin Davies, Time to
Change the Federal Forum Non Conveniens Analysis, 77 TUL. L. REV. 309 (2002); Simona
Grossi, Forum Non Conveniens as a Jurisdictional Doctrine, 75 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (2013);
Lear, supra note 15; Cassandra Burke Robertson, Transnational Litigation and
Institutional Choice, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1081 (2010); Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens
and the Redundancy of Court-Access Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 781 (1985); Margaret G.
Stewart, Forum Non Conveniens: A Doctrine in Search of a Role, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1259
(1986); see also Rutledge, supra note 19, at 1064 n.5 (gathering literature).
24 See, e.g., Bookman, supra note 22, at 1121-29 (arguing that forum non conveniens,
as well as other litigation avoidance doctrines, undermines U.S. interests in the long term);
Lear, supra note 15, at 602 ("[F]ederal forum non conveniens dismissals subvert American
interests in a majority of cases.").
25 See, e.g., Heiser, supra note 16, at 609-10, 623 (describing practical challenges to
refiling complaints in foreign courts). But see Bookman, supra note 22, at 1109 (suggesting
that other countries may be becoming more hospitable to transnational litigation).
26 Whytock & Robertson, supra note 15, at 1450.
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adopted forum non conveniens, that test's "welter of factors" and
broad grant of discretion mean that it can be invoked today in just
about every transnational case.27 Further, that welter of factors-
many of them outdated or otherwise ill suited for transnational
cases8-does not help judges balance the competing comity concerns
at play and may instead obscure judges' true reasons for dismissing
cases. That lack of transparency in reasoning, combined with the do,-
trine's highly discretionary nature,29 can make forum non conveniens
seem unpredictable,30 which in turn prevents businesses from relying
upon it when "making decisions about primary conduct-how to
manage their business and what precautions to take.' 31 Indeed, even
though the Supreme Court intended the doctrine to be applied
"rarely,"32 federal judges grant roughly half of motions to dismiss for
forum non conveniens, at least in written opinions.
33
27 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 516 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting); see also,
e.g., Elizabeth T. Lear, Congress, the Federal Courts, and Forum Non Conveniens: Friction
on the Frontier of the Inherent Power, 91 IowA L. REV. 1147, 1150-51 (2006) ("[V]irtually
no case involving a transnational event is immune from a forum non conveniens battle.").
28 See Davies, supra note 23, at 324-46; see also infra Sections I.B, II.B.
29 For criticisms of the scope of judicial discretion in forum non conveniens, see, for
example, Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 750-54
(1982); Stein, supra note 23, at 784-85.
30 See Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 455 (1994) ("The discretionary nature
of the doctrine, combined with the multifariousness of the factors relevant to its
application . . . make uniformity and predictability of outcome almost impossible.");
Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 516 (Black, J., dissenting) (anticipating that the Court's test "will
inevitably produce a complex of close and indistinguishable decisions from which accurate
prediction of the proper forum will become difficult, if not impossible"); Clermont, supra
note 23, at 221 (arguing that the doctrine's inconsistency is "an indictment of forum non
conveniens itself"). For a contrary perspective on the doctrine's predictability, see
Whytock, supra note 6, at 485 (finding that "judges' forum non conveniens decisions do a
better job distinguishing between appropriate and inappropriate forum shopping, are more
predictable, and are less influenced by caseload and ideology than the doctrine's critics
indicate").
31 Am. Dredging, 510 U.S. at 454. But see Daniel J. Meltzer, Jurisdiction and Discretion
Revisited, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1891, 1904-05 (2004) (questioning the need for
predictability in jurisdictional doctrines as opposed to primary conduct rules given the
difficulty of conforming conduct to account for the former).
32 Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508 (majority opinion) (under forum non conveniens, "the
plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed").
33 See Donald Earl Childress III, Forum Conveniens: The Search for a Convenient
Forum in Transnational Cases, 53 VA. J. INT'L L. 157, 169 (2012) (finding motions to
dismiss for forum non conveniens were granted in forty-eight percent of reported federal
cases between 2007 and 2012); Joel H. Samuels, When Is an Alternative Forum Available?
Rethinking the Forum Non Conveniens Analysis, 85 IND. L.J. 1059, 1077 n.108 (2010)
(finding, on average, a forty-one percent dismissal rate in published federal cases between
1982 and 2007); Whytock, supra note 6, at 502 (estimating a forty-seven percent dismissal
rate in published federal forum non conveniens decisions between 1990 and 2005). There
are dozens of written district court opinions (both reported and unreported) analyzing
forum non conveniens each year. See Childress, supra, at 168-70.
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Third, others argue that this unguided exercise of judicial discre-
tion intrudes too far upon congressional power,34 particularly Con-
gress's authority to define the federal courts' jurisdiction and ensure
the vindication of federal statutory rights.35 These scholars question
whether an individual judge is the best institutional actor to define
court-access policy 36 or to broadly balance comity considerations.37
More fundamentally, it is not clear where the power to dismiss for
forum non conveniens comes from: Though the Supreme Court has
technically reserved the question of whether the state law of forum
non conveniens governs in diversity cases,38 the overwhelming con-
sensus has been that the federal courts are applying a federal doctrine
These studies have all relied, however, on published decisions (meaning decisions
available through the major databases). It is likely that many forum non conveniens
motions are resolved without a published opinion. See David Freeman Engstrom, The
Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical Study of Civil Procedure, 65 STAN. L. REv. 1203, 1208-09,
1209 n.24, 1214-17 (2013) (discussing selection bias stemming from reliance on Westlaw
and Lexis). Further, it is unclear in what percentage of transnational cases the motion is
raised, how often it is a subsidiary ground for dismissal, or how the rate of dismissal
compares to the rate at which cases are dismissed on other grounds. Indeed, it may be that
the grant rate for forum non conveniens motions is similar to (or even less than) the rate at
which Rule 12(b)(6) motions are granted. See, e.g., Scott Dodson, A New Look: Dismissal
Rates of Federal Civil Claims, 96 JUDICATURE 127, 132 tbl.2 (2012) (finding that, even
before Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), Rule 12(b)(6) motions were granted
more than seventy percent of the time). These studies thus provide only a partial picture of
forum non conveniens practice in federal courts, but they nonetheless indicate that the
doctrine's invocation is not uncommon, despite the Supreme Court's admonition to the
contrary.
34 See Lear, supra note 27, at 1152-53 (arguing that forum non conveniens is in fact "an
unconstitutional usurpation of congressional power"); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent
Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 855 (2001)
(arguing that the "power to dismiss suits" on the basis that they are "better brought in state
or foreign courts" belongs to Congress, not federal judges); cf Stephen B. Burbank,
Jurisdictional Conflict and Jurisdictional Equilibration: Paths to a Via Media?, 26 Hous. J.
INT'L L. 385, 399-400 (2004) (arguing forum non conveniens should not be applied in
statutory cases because it undermines domestic regulatory interests).
35 Forum non conveniens is effectively an abstention doctrine. See William P. Marshall,
Abstention, Separation of Powers, and Recasting the Meaning of Judicial Restraint, 107 Nw.
U. L. REV. 881, 883 (2013) (defining abstention as "a set of judicially created doctrines
under which federal courts may choose to decline to exercise their jurisdiction over cases
otherwise appropriately before them"). Even if abstention doctrines are not
unconstitutional, as Professor Martin Redish once argued, see Martin H. Redish,
Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71
(1984), they still raise concerns about the appropriate balance of power between Congress
and the courts, see, e.g., Marshall, supra, at 898.
36 See Robertson, supra note 23 (applying institutional choice theory to conclude that
Congress and the Executive should have the leading role in defining court-access policy).
37 Cf Paul, supra note 9, at 75 (arguing that reciprocity is better achieved through
multilateral treaties negotiated by the political branches than through broad judicial
weighing).
38 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 248 n.13 (1981) (citing Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 509 (1947)).
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in all cases.39 Yet the doctrine is not federal common law in the tradi-
tional sense, nor is it derived from the federal rules.40 The Court has
suggested it is an inherent power41 (despite its relatively recent prove-
nance42), but it has not considered or supported the ramifications of
such a claim.43
Given all of these concerns, critics of the doctrine have unsurpris-
ingly suggested myriad reforms.44 But reform will not be enough: The
problems in the structure and history of the doctrine run too deep.
This Article challenges the assumption that reforming forum non con-
veniens is either feasible or sufficient. First, Part I aims to demytholo-
gize the doctrine: Forum non conveniens does not have the deep
historical roots that many-including the Supreme Court-seem to
have assumed.45 Further, what historical pedigree the doctrine does
39 RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: JURISDICTION § 304 cmt. b & reporters' note 2 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft
No. 2, 2016); 14D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3828.5, at 727 n.10 (4th ed. 2013) (collecting cases); see also, e.g., BORN & RUTLEDGE,
supra note 14, at 453-54 (reading American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443 (1994), as
suggesting that forum non conveniens is a matter of federal law). This Article assumes that
the federal doctrine of forum non conveniens is a matter of federal procedural law (though
not necessarily federal common law) in both federal question and diversity cases.
40 See Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common Law, 94 VA. L. REV. 813, 826-27
(2008) (noting uncertain authority for forum non conveniens).
41 See, e.g., Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1891 (2016). For a critique of the
invocation of inherent power to justify forum non conveniens, see Lear, supra note 27. On
the interplay between the courts' inherent powers and their common law-making authority
in the area of federal procedure, see Barrett, supra note 40.
42 See infra Part I.
43 See Pushaw, supra note 34, at 743 (urging repudiation of the "practice of exercising
beneficial [inherent] powers without congressional authorization," including forum non
conveniens).
44 The most thorough critiques of forum non conveniens to date have focused on
reforming or narrowing the doctrine. See, e.g., KARAYANNI, supra note 23, at 199-232;
Davies, supra note 23; Stein, supra note 23, 842-46. The most common proposed reform,
to which the following analysis lends support, is the addition of a strong presumption for
retaining jurisdiction if the case is brought in the defendant's home forum. See, e.g.,
Bookman, supra note 22, at 1122-23, 1140-41. Other proposals include, inter alia,
reinvigorating the inquiry into whether an adequate and available alternative forum in fact
exists, see Samuels, supra note 33; updating the private and public interests enumerated by
the Court, see Davies, supra note 23, at 323-64; and favoring the retention of transnational
cases if U.S. law applies, if the applicable foreign law is easily ascertainable, or if the
resulting judgment would be enforced here, see Childress, supra note 33, at 177-79.
45 Others have raised doubts about the doctrine's historical pedigree. See David W.
Robertson & Paula K. Speck, Access to State Courts in Transnational Personal Injury
Cases: Forum Non Conveniens and Antisuit Injunctions, 68 TEX. L. REV. 937, 948 n.68
(1990); Stein, supra note 23, at 796 & n.43; see also Robert Braucher, The Inconvenient
Federal Forum, 60 HARV. L. REV. 908, 909-18 (1947) (tracing the limited history of the
doctrine). Part I of this Article builds on this literature to show how the limited history of
forum non conveniens also explains why the current test is such a poor fit for transnational
litigation today.
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have does not match how it is being used today. Once we understand
the doctrine's recent, pragmatic origins, the conversation need no
longer be limited to questions of reform; we can start asking instead
whether the doctrine has simply outlived its purpose. Second, Part II
explains why reforming forum non conveniens is unlikely to work-
and may even backfire.46 This Part draws on arguments I have made
elsewhere regarding the design of procedural inquiries in transna-
tional litigation.47 It explains that the needed reforms for forum non
conveniens would increase its complexity while asking judges to
undertake inquiries that stretch the limits of judicial capacity. That is a
recipe for worse, not better, decisionmaking.48
Third, in light of recent Supreme Court developments, Part III
suggests that the need for forum non conveniens is fading away. Over
the last thirty years, shifts in personal jurisdiction doctrine, the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality, and the enforceability of forum
selection clauses have vastly circumscribed the scope of transnational
litigation in U.S. courts.49 When combined with other comity doctrines
and court management ools already at judges' disposal, these shifts
suggest that judges no longer need forum non conveniens to address
defendant fairness and international comity concerns.50
Instead of trying to fix the doctrine, then, this Article urges its
retirement.51 Part IV describes what that path to retirement might
46 See infra Part II.
47 See Maggie Gardner, Parochial Procedure, 69 STAN. L. REV. 941 (2017).
48 See Ronald A. Heiner, The Origin of Predictable Behavior, 73 AM. ECON. REv. 560,
563-65 (1983) (explaining that "when genuine uncertainty exists [in terms of either the
reliability of an agent's perceptual abilities or the complexity of the environment], allowing
greater flexibility to react to more information or administer a more complex repertoire of
actions will not necessarily enhance an agent's performance").
49 See infra Part III; see also Bookman, supra note 22 (discussing such developments as
part of a broader trend towards avoiding transnational litigation in U.S. courts).
50 For similar discussions of how recent Supreme Court developments may reduce the
need for forum non conveniens, see Stephen B. Burbank, International Civil Litigation in
U.S. Courts: Becoming a Paper Tiger?, 33 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 663 (2012) (discussing personal
jurisdiction, class actions, and discovery reform); Rutledge, supra note 19, at 1069-71
(discussing personal jurisdiction and the presumption against extraterritoriality).
51 Despite the range of criticisms, only a few scholars have suggested abandoning the
doctrine. See Lear, supra note 27, at 1152 (stating that forum non conveniens should be
abandoned as "an unconstitutional usurpation of congressional power"); Stewart, supra
note 23, at 1263 (arguing that, given its redundancy with personal and prescriptive
jurisdiction doctrines, forum non conveniens "has outlived its usefulness"). Some scholars
have suggested, however, that its retirement is only a matter of time. See Clermont, supra
note 23, at 226 (observing that if jurisdictional doctrines were rationalized, "[m]aybe we do
not need [forum non conveniens] at all"); Rutledge, supra note 19, at 1065 ("While it is
most certainly not the case that the underlying justification for the forum non conveniens
doctrine has disappeared entirely, other doctrines may potentially better serve those
residual functions. At bottom, then, we are entering an era where the forum non
conveniens doctrine is ripe for radical reexamination.").
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look like. The easiest steps include consolidating doctrinal reform in
the lower courts and reducing the courts' use of the doctrine.52 While I
am skeptical that such an insurgency approach will be sufficient on its
own, it can be a helpful-even a critical-first step. Meanwhile, the
Supreme Court and Congress should continue to develop more
helpful, alternative doctrines that will further displace the need for
forum non conveniens,53 and they should explicitly narrow the cate-
gory of transnational cases in which the doctrine can be used.54 These
reforms will ensure that the United States is prepared at the negoti-
ating table, when the time is right, to let go of forum non conveniens
once and for all in exchange for a new treaty on jurisdiction and the
mutual enforcement of judgments.55 Such a treaty will do more to fur-
ther U.S. interests, party fairness, and international comity than will
the outdated and muddled judge-made doctrine of forum non
conveniens.
Before beginning, however, a critical caveat on the scope of this
project is in order: The Article is focused on forum non conveniens as
a doctrine of federal law used by the federal courts to manage trans-
national litigation. Though most U.S. states also recognize a version of
forum non conveniens, state doctrines are diverse,56 and state courts
often use forum non conveniens to dismiss cases in favor of courts in
sister states, a context for which the doctrine is more appropriate.
57
Because state use of forum non conveniens involves a different set of
issues and considerations, the following analysis by necessity is limited
to the federal doctrine of forum non conveniens.
I
THE WRONG TEST
Though the Supreme Court has asserted forum non conveniens is
a doctrine with a "long history, '58 that history is more limited and
52 See infra Sections IV.A, IV.B.
53 See infra Section IV.C.
54 See infra Section IV.D.
55 See infra Section IV.E.
56 On the diversity of state doctrines, see, for example, Robertson & Speck, supra note
45, at 950-51; Linda J. Silberman, The Impact of Jurisdictional Rules and Recognition
Practice on International Business Transactions: The U.S. Regime, 26 Hous. J. INT'L L. 327,
341 (2004) (noting that "courts in some states reject or limit [forum non conveniens's]
application in various ways").
57 In particular, the domestic context avoids some of the problems that can arise in
transnational cases. For example, state courts dismissing cases in favor of sister-state courts
can assume that the alternative forum will apply similar procedures, cf infra text
accompanying notes 316-18, and that any resulting judgment will warrant full faith and
credit, cf supra text accompanying notes 22, 26.
58 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 248 n.13 (1981).
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contingent than the Court has perhaps realized. This Part aims to
demythologize forum non conveniens by reviewing the doctrine's
fairly recent provenance and by laying bare the discontinuities
between the uses for which the doctrine was created and the uses to
which it is put today.
This Part starts by describing the history of forum non conveniens
as that of three separate doctrines which developed in the 1800s and
early 1900s.59 In 1947, the Supreme Court amalgamated two of those
doctrines into a new doctrine for use within the federal judicial
system.60 It then extended that domestic test to transnational cases in
1981 without significant modifications.61 The rest of the Part explains
why that 1947 test is the wrong test for transnational litigation today.
First, as a test designed for a domestic context, it does not directly
account for the international comity concerns that arise in transna-
tional cases. Second, its focus on the availability of evidence reflects
an era when long-distance litigation was not just expensive, but infea-
sible. That emphasis on evidence gathering is increasingly anachro-
nistic. And third, it presumes the defendant is a nonresident of the
forum with minimal connections to it, in keeping with all three of the
original doctrines of forum non conveniens. Yet forum non con-
veniens is often used today to dismiss cases brought against local
defendants. Whatever historical pedigree forum non conveniens can
legitimately claim, it does not extend that far.
59 On the nineteenth and early twentieth century origins of forum non conveniens, see,
for example, BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 14, at 366-68; Edward L. Barrett, Jr., The
Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 380, 387 n.35 (1947). Barrett did
find a few isolated Scottish cases from the seventeenth century in which the court declined
jurisdiction because the parties were nonresidents and trial in Scotland would be
inappropriate. Barrett, supra, at 387. Those cases might be considered early progenitors of
a practice that did not otherwise develop in Scotland until the nineteenth century. See id.
Another scholar has suggested that venue transfers within England during the seventeenth
through early nineteenth centuries provide an early analogue for modern forum non
conveniens practice. See Roger S. Foster, Place of Trial-Interstate Application of
Intrastate Methods of Adjustment, 44 HARV. L. REv. 41, 43-45 (1930). That English venue
practice, however, involved transferring cases within a single sovereign system; in contrast,
forum non conveniens has primarily involved dismissing cases in favor of separate
sovereigns. The English venue practice does not speak to the power of the courts to engage
in the latter practice, which English courts did not recognize until the twentieth century-
and when they did so, they looked not to these domestic venue transfer cases, but to the
Scottish (and American) practice of forum non conveniens. See Barrett, supra, at 387-88.
60 See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947); Koster v. (Am.) Lumbermens
Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947).
61 See Piper, 454 U.S. 235.
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A. The Rise of Forum Non Conveniens
Over the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
revolutions in transportation and trade meant individuals and busi-
nesses had connections that were both further ranging and more tran-
sitory than ever before. At the same time and for similar reasons,
conceptions of jurisdiction were expanding beyond strict erritori-
ality.62 The jurisdictional reach of domestic ourts was becoming both
wider and shallower,63 and courts inside and outside the United States
were developing rationales for declining cases that reached too far.
64
First, the Scottish courts developed a practice in the 1800s of
declining jurisdiction against foreign defendants when its exercise
would be unjust.65 The English courts adopted a similar practice after
the turn of the century.66 Second, U.S. courts sitting in admiralty occa-
sionally exercised their discretion to dismiss suits involving foreign
plaintiffs and foreign defendants67 based in part on considerations of
international comity.68
Then there were the U.S. state courts of general jurisdiction. Few
U.S. states had adopted a practice like forum non conveniens by 1947,
and more had rejected it.69 New York was an outlier, both because it
had embraced the power to decline jurisdiction most fully and because
that power was based on a third rationale70 : Rather than emphasizing
either international comity or unfairness to defendants, New York
courts focused almost exclusively on the burdens imposed on local
62 On the decoupling of territory and jurisdiction, see generally KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES
THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG? THE EVOLUTION OF TERRITORIALITY IN
AMERICAN LAW (2009).
63 See, e.g., Rutledge, supra note 19, at 1066-67 (describing the loosening of
jurisdictional rules at the turn of the last century).
64 For a detailed account of the evolution of court-access policies in the United States
in this period, see generally EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY:
FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870-1958 (1992).
65 See Braucher, supra note 45, at 909-11.
66 See id.
67 See, e.g., Can. Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd., 285 U.S. 413, 421 (1932)
("The rule recognizing an unqualified discretion to decline jurisdiction in suits in admiralty
between foreigners appears to be supported by an unbroken line of decisions in the lower
federal courts.").
68 See infra text accompanying notes 99-101.
69 Barrett, supra note 59, at 388-89; see also PURCELL, supra note 64, at 188 ("Prior to
1910 the doctrine of forum non conveniens was largely unknown to American courts
outside admiralty, but after World War I a few state courts began to discuss the doctrine
and to give it effect.").
70 See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 14, at 367 (noting New York's early and hearty
adoption of forum non conveniens); Barrett, supra note 59, at 404 (similar).
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courts and communities by cases that involved out-of-state plaintiffs,
out-of-state defendants, and out-of-state harms.
71
In 1947, the Supreme Court affirmed the use of forum non con-
veniens in federal courts, articulating as it did so a new test for the
doctrine that combined the Scottish and New York rationales. Gulf
Oil Co. v. Gilbert72 was a domestic, interstate dispute: It involved a
Virginian suing a Pennsylvanian corporation over a warehouse fire in
Virginia, yet the Virginian had brought his claims in federal court in
New York.73 In approving the New York court's dismissal of that case
for forum non conveniens, the Supreme Court established the test still
used by federal courts today.
74
That test starts from the premise that "the plaintiff's choice of
forum should rarely be disturbed" unless the balance of interests "is
strongly in favor of the defendant.' 75 The Gilbert Court then articu-
lated a nonexhaustive list of private and public interest factors to be
weighed.76 The private interest factors, which reflect the Scottish prac-
tice,77 include:
[1] the relative ease of access to sources of proof; [2] availability of
compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of
obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; [3] possibility of view of
premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and [4] all
other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious
and inexpensive. There may also be questions as to [5] the
enforcibility [sic] of a judgment if one is obtained.
78
71 See, e.g., Pietraroia v. N.J. & H.R. Ry. & Ferry Co., 91 N.E. 120, 122 (N.Y. 1910)
("[i1t is intolerable that our courts should be impeded in their administration of justice,
and that the people of the state should be burdened with expense, in redressing wrongs
committed in another state, for the benefit, solely, of its citizens, and where the remedy is
in the enforcement of its statutes."); Collard v. Beach, 87 N.Y.S. 884, 885-86 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1904) (emphasizing docket congestion as a reason for declining to adjudicate out-of-
state cases).
72 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947). While Gilbert approved the use of forum non
conveniens for cases at law, a companion case, Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mutual
Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518, 522, 531-32 (1947), approved the doctrine's use for equitable
claims.
73 Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 502-03.
74 See, e.g., Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 581 n.6 (2013).
75 Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508.
76 Id. at 508-09.
77 As the Supreme Court has since recognized, the real roots of Gilbert and Koster are
in the Scottish practice. Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 449-50 (1994). On the
influence of Scottish law on the federal judiciary more broadly, see generally James E.
Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III and the Scottish Judiciary, 124 HARV. L. REv. 1613
(2011).
78 Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508.
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The public interest factors, on the other hand, reflect the New
York state court practice.79 They include [1] the "[a]dministrative dif-
ficulties [that] follow for courts when litigation is piled up in congested
centers instead of being handled at its origin"; [2] the "appropriate-
ness ... in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at
home with the state law that must govern the case, rather than having
a court in some other forum untangle problems in conflict of laws, and
in law foreign to itself"; and [3] the undue burden of jury duty on a
community "which has no relation to the litigation" versus the "local
interest in having localized controversies decided at home. ' 80
The Gilbert test was a pragmatic solution for a particular house-
keeping problem faced by the federal courts in the years following
International Shoe Co. v. Washington,8 ' as the expansion of available
forums enabled greater forum shopping by plaintiffs.8 2 Forum non
conveniens was not the only possible solution,3 nor was it designed to
be a universal solution.8 4 Indeed, soon after Gilbert was decided,
Congress adopted a slightly different solution in the forum of the
venue transfer statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404, which allows federal courts to
transfer (rather than dismiss) cases more properly heard in another
federal district.85 But Congress and the Court did not develop similar
solutions for managing jurisdictional excess in transnational cases.86
79 This is not surprising, given that the most influential article written on forum non
conveniens leading up to Gilbert was authored by a New York lawyer. See BORN &
RUTLEDGE, supra note 14, at 367-69 (discussing the influence of Paxton Blair's article, The
Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 1
(1929)); Stein, supra note 23, at 811 ("Blair's article was met with the kind of judicial
reception that law professors dream of.").
80 Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508-09. Similarly, the Court acknowledged that "[i]n cases which
touch the affairs of many persons, there is reason for holding the trial in their view and
reach rather than in remote parts of the country where they can learn of it by report only."
Id. at 509.
81 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
82 See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens as Applied in
the Federal Courts in Matters of Admiralty: An Object Lesson in Uncontrolled Discretion,
35 CORNELL L.Q. 12, 14 (1949) (noting the need for forum non conveniens at that time in
light of expanding personal jurisdiction and venue provisions); Stephen B. Burbank,
Jurisdictional Equilibration, the Proposed Hague Convention and Progress in National
Law, 49 AM. J. CoMP. L. 203, 210-11 (2001) (linking the adoption of forum non
conveniens to International Shoe); Stein, supra note 23, at 801-02 (same).
83 See Stein, supra note 23, at 808-12 (describing alternative solutions explored by the
Supreme Court prior to Gilbert).
84 See, e.g., Grossi, supra note 23, at 16 ("Gilbert was, in essence, a venue-transfer case,
and the standards there developed [were] those appropriate to a change of venue motion"
within a single judicial system.).
85 See Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malay. Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430 (2007).
86 See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 252 & n.18 (1981) (fretting that U.S.
courts were too attractive to foreign plaintiffs and listing reasons-presumptively
illegitimate-for why foreign plaintiffs would prefer U.S. forums). Part of the argument of
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Then in 1981, in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,87 the Supreme Court
extended Gilbert's domestic test to transnational cases.88 In Piper, the
British heirs of British victims of an airplane crash in Scotland sued
the U.S. manufacturers of the airplane and its propellers in U.S.
court.89 The district court applied the Gilbert test to dismiss the case
for forum non conveniens, reasoning that it belonged in the Scottish
courts.90 In affirming, the Supreme Court did not adapt the Gilbert
test or update its factors despite the transnational context. It did, how-
ever, add two glosses to the test's initial presumption. First, the Piper
Court held that a foreign plaintiff's choice of forum should receive
less deference than that of a domestic plaintiff.91 Second, it clarified
that there must be an adequate and available alternative forum before
a case can be dismissed for forum non conveniens,92 but it set that bar
very low: The requirement will generally be satisfied as long as "the
defendant is 'amenable to process' in the other jurisdiction" and the
plaintiff has access to some remedy, even if significantly limited.93 The
current test, as articulated in Gilbert and modified slightly by Piper, is
summarized in Table 1.
The rest of this Part describes why this test is not the right test for
evaluating the appropriateness of U.S. jurisdiction in transnational
cases today.
B. The Absence of Comity
Both courts and commentators today treat forum non conveniens
as, at least in part, a comity doctrine.94 Yet the Supreme Court in
Gilbert was concerned about judicial administration within the federal
this Article is that these background conditions have changed: Since Piper, the Court has
been developing other solutions for determining how to draw the line between cases that
belong in U.S. courts and cases that do not. See infra Part III.
87 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
88 See id. at 241 n.6, 257-61 (applying the Gilbert factors).
89 Id. at 238-39. The legal secretary of the heirs' U.S. attorney initially brought suit in
California state court after California appointed her the administratrix of the passengers'
estates. Id. at 239-40. On the defendants' motions, the case was removed to federal court
and then transferred to Pennsylvania, where one of the defendants was based. Id. at 240.
90 Id. at 241-44. The plaintiffs, who admitted they sought a U.S. forum for its more
favorable tort law, were unable to secure affordable counsel in Scotland, and the suit was
never refiled. Clermont, supra note 23, at 207, 222.
91 Piper, 454 U.S. at 255-56. The rationale was that a foreigner's choice of a U.S. forum
presumably would not reflect that plaintiff's personal convenience. Id.
92 Id. at 254 & n.22.
93 Id. (quoting Gilbert v. Gulf Oil Co., 330 U.S. 501, 506-07 (1947)).
94 See, e.g., Ford v. Brown, 319 F.3d 1302, 1307, 1309-10, 1309 n.22 (11th Cir. 2003)
(basing forum non conveniens dismissal in part on considerations of comity); Dodge, supra
note 9, at 2109-10 (listing forum non conveniens as a comity doctrine while acknowledging
that the test does not explicitly mention comity).
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TABLE 1: FEDERAL FORUM NON CONVENIENS ANALYSIS
Threshold Inquiries Private Interest Factors Public Interest Factors
(Piper) (Gilbert) (Gilbert)
1. "[R]elative ease of 1 "Administrativeaccess to sources of 1 mnsrtv
proof" difficulties [that] follow
for courts when litigation
2. "[A]vailability of is piled up in congested
compulsory process for centers instead of being
attendance of unwilling, handled at its origin"
and the cost of obtaining 2. Preference for "having
1. Presumption in favor attendance of willing, the trial of a diversity
of plaintiff's choice of witnesses" case in a forum that is at
forum (but foreign home with the state lawpanis evles 3. The "possibility of ta utgvr h
plaintiffs receive less view of premises, if view that must govern thedeference) would be appropriate to case, rather than having
the action" a court in some other
2. Requirement of an forum untangle problems
adequate, available 4. "[A]ll other practica in conflict of laws, and in
alternative forum problems that make trial law foreign to itself"
of a case easy, 3. Undue burden of jury
expeditious and duty on a community
inexpensive" (e.g., t "which has no relation to
joinder, translation costs) the litigation" versus the
5. "[T]he enforcibility "local interest in having
[sic] of a judgment if one localized controversiesis obtained" decided at home"
system, not competing sovereign interests. Even in Piper, the Court
did not identify international comity as a distinct consideration.95 This
absence of comity is explained in part by Gilbert's domestic context,
but it also reflects the Gilbert Court's choice not to draw on admiralty
cases when constructing its test for forum non conveniens.
Because admiralty jurisdiction lacked the territorial requirements
or venue restrictions placed on the law courts,96 it was not uncommon
for admiralty courts in the 1800s to confront suits between foreigners,
95 The Piper majority did note that Scotland had "a very strong interest" in the case
because the controversy was centered there, but it did not clearly identify that concern as
distinct from concerns about judicial resources; instead, it emphasized in the same breath
that the case's retention would waste the resources of U.S. courts. See Piper, 454 U.S. at
260-61 ("The American interest in this accident is simply not sufficient to justify the
enormous commitment of judicial time and resources that would inevitably be required if
the case were to be tried here.").
96 See, e.g., Calamita, supra note 9, at 634 (describing the role of forum non conveniens
in constraining admiralty courts' expansive jurisdictional scope).
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including for conduct that occurred outside of U.S. territorial waters.
97
To keep that jurisdictional reach in check, U.S. courts sitting in admi-
ralty would occasionally decline to exercise jurisdiction over such
cases.98 Often among the factors courts considered was a concern for
international comity.99 Thus, for example, a judge might weigh the
desire for reciprocal protection of seamen in foreign courts (a positive
adjudicative comity concern) against a concern that hearing a case
would disrupt the free movement of commerce (a negative adjudica-
tive comity concern).100 Admiralty courts also gave great weight to the
protests of foreign consuls, though such protests were not in them-
selves determinative.101
Given that these admiralty cases provided the strongest federal
precedent for forum non conveniens,'0 2 it is notable that the Gilbert
Court avoided relying on them.10 3 That was in part a strategic deci-
sion, as the Gilbert majority had to establish that the power to decline
jurisdiction was not limited to equity and admiralty, but could extend
to cases at law as well.'04 That only underscores, however, that Gilbert
97 See GUSTAVUS H. ROBINSON, HANDBOOK OF ADMIRALTY LAw IN THE UNITED
STATES 14-15 (1939) (describing the breadth of admiralty jurisdiction, which extends to
causes of action "involving wholly foreign litigants and a foreign situs").
98 Cf. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 513 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting)
(asserting that forum non conveniens was used in maritime cases "[f]or reasons peculiar to
the special problems of admiralty").
99 See, e.g., Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 463-65 (1994) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (collecting admiralty cases from this era that emphasized comity concerns).
100 See Bickel, supra note 82, at 20-21; see also Rutledge, supra note 19, at 1065-66
(noting U.S. admiralty courts "would abstain from reaching the suit [between foreign
parties] in order to avoid aggravating a foreign sovereign that might reasonably lay a
superior claim to resolving the parties' liabilities"); Stein, supra note 23, at 810 (noting that
admiralty courts needed overbroad jurisdiction to ensure foreign seamen would have
access to remedies and that forum non conveniens allowed them to check that jurisdiction
when it reached too far).
101 See Hobart Coffey, Jurisdiction over Foreigners in Admiralty Courts, 13 CALIF. L.
REV. 93, 96 (1925).
102 As Edward Barrett, Jr., concluded in 1947, "Only in admiralty cases has there been
any considerable body of experience with a rule giving trial courts discretion to refuse to
assume jurisdiction of causes, and that experience has been for the most part ignored in the
application of the doctrine in other types of cases." Barrett, supra note 59, at 419 (footnote
omitted); see also ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICr OF LAWS 123
(1962) ("Admiralty courts have administered what in effect has been a doctrine of forum
non conveniens much longer than land courts."); Braucher, supra note 45, at 919 ("[I]t was
in admiralty cases ... that the federal courts first developed their discretionary power to
decline jurisdiction.").
103 Gilbert cited the Court's admiralty jurisprudence only once, and only to emphasize
the dictum in that precedent hat "[c]ourts of equity and of law also occasionally decline, in
the interest of justice, to exercise jurisdiction .... " Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 504 (emphasis
added) (quoting Can. Malting Co. v. Paterson S.S., Ltd., 285 U.S. 413, 423 (1932)).
104 See Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 513-14 (Black, J., dissenting) (castigating the majority for
extending the discretionary power to dismiss cases beyond admiralty and equity).
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was not a consolidation of forum non conveniens doctrine across law,
equity, and admiralty. Rather, Gilbert and its companion case, Koster
v. (American) Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. ,105 defined a test for
suits at law or in equity while arguably leaving distinct the separate
practice of the admiralty courts. Not surprisingly, then, admiralty's
concern for the maintenance of international comity makes no
appearance in Gilbert's private or public interest factors.
There is some irony in courts today analyzing forum non con-
veniens motions in admiralty cases by applying Gilbert's private and
public interest factors, which do not account for the international
comity concerns addressed by many of the old admiralty cases.10 6 A
second irony is that, because these admiralty suits between foreigners
tend to be the easiest cases for forum non conveniens dimissals, they
reinforce the sense that the doctrine is still needed across the courts'
dockets.10 7 But there is a third irony as well. Gilbert's public interest
factors, far from incorporating admiralty's comity concerns, instead
reflect the version of forum non conveniens used by the New York
state courts, which focused on the local court's administrative con-
cerns. That means Gilbert's public interest factors do not simply lack
an explicit negative comity consideration; they are inherently inward
looking, asking only whether this forum would be inconvenienced by
hearing the case, an orientation which runs counter to positive comity
commitments as well.
C. An Anachronistic Focus on Evidence
Unlike the admiralty precedent, the Gilbert Court did draw on
Scottish and English practice in articulating Gilbert's private interest
factors. But the concerns motivating that Scottish and English practice
have largely been resolved by legal and technological developments
since Gilbert was decided.
105 330 U.S. 518 (1947).
106 Thus fifty years later, Justice Scalia writing for the Court in an admiralty case would
state that the roots of forum non conveniens were not in admiralty but in Scottish
precedent. Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 449 (1994). While Justice Scalia was
correct to the extent he was talking about the doctrine of forum non conveniens as
articulated in Gilbert, Justice Kennedy was also correct in his dissent when he countered
that forum non conveniens has a lengthy pedigree in admiralty, complete with its own set
of justifications centered around international comity and commerce. Id. at 464-66
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
107 For example, the Court's suggestion that courts apply forum non conveniens to
resolve easy cases in lieu of addressing difficult jurisdictional questions, see Sinochem Int'l
Co. v. Malay. Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 425 (2007), was based on an admiralty
case that involved foreign plaintiffs, foreign defendants, and foreign harms, as well as
parallel proceedings in a foreign forum-an easy case under the original admiralty practice
that belies the difficulties forum non conveniens can raise in nonadmiralty cases.
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At the turn of the last century, it could be "insuperable"10 8 to try
a case in a distant forum. Requiring businesses or professionals to
travel long distances for trial, bringing with them the books and
papers needed to run their companies, could fundamentally disrupt
defendants' livelihoods.10 9 In contrast, long-distance litigation today
poses a much lower risk of injustice to defendants. As Professor
Martin Davies has shown, the private interests factors' focus on access
to evidence is increasingly anachronistic.110
Consider the first private interest factor, the ease of access to
documents. Gilbert and Piper reflect an era of physical document pro-
duction, of conference rooms filled with bankers boxes.11" ' Today,
however, when litigators complain about the cost of discovery, they
have in mind the cost not of transportation or even of reproduction,
but of compiling and sifting through thousands of electronic docu-
ments.11 2 That work can be (and increasingly is) conducted remotely,
regardless of where any resulting trial would take place." 3 Further,
108 See Pierce v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of U.S., 12 N.E. 858, 863 (Mass. 1887)
(noting concern but not finding it applicable).
109 See Logan v. Bank of Scot. (No. 2) [1906] 1 KB 141 at 152-53 (Eng.) ("[I]t is difficult
to conceive anything more harassing to the defendant bank than to have their officials
dragged up to London for a lengthy trial .... and when together with their officials they
would have to bring up here, and keep away from their business, numerous other witnesses
with a mass of books, papers and documents . . . ."); see also Egbert v. Short [1907] 2 Ch
205 at 211-12 (Eng.) (expressing concern about irreparable disruption to defendants'
professions in India if required to defend in England); In re Norton's Settlement [1908] 1
Ch 471 at 486-87 (Eng.) (same).
As one American commentator in the 1940s put it:
Witnesses may be unwilling to travel; and when they do, the expenses involved
are considerable. Documents also may have to be transported, and dispensed
with for lengthy periods of time, as well as subjected to the risk of loss. In the
case of a corporation, the witnesses may be key employees whose time is
valuable to the defendant, and who, if the trial is at a distant place, will have to
be away from their jobs for long periods of time ....
Bickel, supra note 82, at 14 n.15; see also Barrett, supra note 59, at 381-82 (similar). Each
of these concerns, as this Section will explain, has been significantly ameliorated since the
1940s.
110 See Davies, supra note 23, at 324-25; see also BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 14, at
415-16.
111 In 1947, the best evidence rule still required the production of original documents.
Davies, supra note 23, at 336. And while the advisory committee in 1970 clarified that the
production of documents might include "electronic data compilations," it had in mind the
physical printouts of computer data. FED. R. Civ. P. 34 advisory committee's note to 1970
amendment.
112 See, e.g., Richard Marcus, "Looking Backward" to 1938, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1691,
1724-25 (2014) (noting concerns about the growing cost and complexity of electronic
discovery, as well as the rise of predictive algorithms to manage it).
113 See, e.g., Debra Cassens Weiss, E-discovery Rule Changes Boost Legal Outsourcing
to India, ABA J. (Apr. 4, 2008, 2:37 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/e-discov
ery-rule-changes boost-legal outsourcing-to-india.
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the legal difference between here and there is also diminishing. When
foreign documents are in the hands of a party or a party's affiliate,
federal judges consistently compel the production of that evidence
pursuant to the Federal Rules, even in the face of potentially con-
flicting foreign laws.
114
Today borders pose serious legal challenges only when docu-
ments are held by third parties not subject to the personal jurisdiction
of the U.S. court-a category that will admittedly grow now that the
Supreme Court has reduced the scope of general jurisdiction.11 5 In
those situations, however, two international conventions organized by
the Hague Conference on Private International Law have helped
make the collection of such documents increasingly feasible.11 6 The
Apostille Convention17 has simplified the process of obtaining public
documents from foreign countries-a category of evidence that
includes family records, land titles, patents, court judgments, and
notarized signatures. More than 100 countries now belong to the
Apostille Convention, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
amended in 1991 to incorporate the Apostille Convention as a much-
simplified method for certifying foreign attestations.118 Meanwhile,
the Evidence Convention1 9 has significantly reduced U.S. courts' reli-
ance on letters rogatory, or ad hoc requests that other countries ful-
filled (if at all) only as a matter of diplomatic grace. Though the
114 See Gardner, supra note 47, at 968-83 (criticizing the practice).
115 See Cassandra Burke Robertson & Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, A Shifting
Equilibrium: Personal Jurisdiction, Transnational Litigation, and the Problem of
Nonparties, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 643, 647-49 (2015) (discussing the impact of
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014), on transnational evidence collection).
116 As a point of comparison, in 1947, the Hague Conference had not adopted a
convention since 1904; all of those antiquated conventions have since been replaced by
thirty-eight modern conventions. See About HCCH, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE
INT'L LAW, https://www.hcch.net/en/about (last visited Jan. 22, 2017).
117 Convention Abolishing the Requirement of Legalisation for Foreign Public
Documents, opened for signature Oct. 5, 1961, 33 U.S.T. 883, 527 U.N.T.S. 189.
118 FED. R. Civ. P. 44 advisory committee's note to 1991 amendment. In 2011 alone, just
a handful of U.S. states and the federal government reported issuing more than 300,000
apostilles for use in other countries, a number that is proportional to those reported by
other member countries. See U.S., PART B - QUESTIONS FOR CONTRACTING STATES, at B-
3, https://assets.hcch.net/upload/wop/apostille20l2-usa.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2017)
(providing the United States' response to a January 2012 questionnaire regarding the
Apostille Convention); PERMANENT BUREAU, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT'L
LAW, SYNOPSIS OF RESPONSES TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE OF JANUARY 2012 RELATING TO
THE HAGUE CONVENTION OF 5 OCTOBER 1961 ABOLISHING THE REQUIREMENT OF
LEGALISATION FOR FOREIGN PUBLIC DOCUMENTS (Apostille Convention) 16-17 (rev.
2013), https://assets.hcch.net/upload/wop/2012apostille-pd3.pdf. There is no easy way to
identify how many apostilles are issued each year to parties in U.S. litigation.
119 Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters,
opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter Evidence
Convention].
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Evidence Convention's membership is more limited, it includes major
U.S. trading partners like most European Union member states,
Mexico, and China.120 Those countries are now obliged to help exe-
cute requests for gathering evidence within their territory to the
greatest extent possible.12' While the Evidence Convention is an
imperfect solution, 22 the process is getting easier;23 at the very least,
it is troubling that judges overlook the Evidence Convention when
treating foreign evidence in the hands of third parties as an insur-
mountable obstacle.124
120 Status Table 20: Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in
Civil or Commercial Matters, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW, https://www
.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=82 (last updated Jan. 12, 2017)
(listing fifty-nine member states).
121 See Evidence Convention, supra note 119, arts. 2, 3, 10 (outlining procedure for
responding to requests). For exceptions, see id. art. 12.
122 See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, A Tea Party at The Hague?, 18 Sw. J. INT'L L. 629,
633-34 (2012) (suggesting "we would be better off starting over from scratch" given
changes in member states' approaches to discovery since the convention's negotiation in
the 1960s). Member states report that most requests for assistance are now processed
within four months, though some still take more than a year. See PERMANENT BUREAU,
HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW, SYNOPSIS OF RESPONSES TO THE
QUESTIONNAIRE OF NOVEMBER 2013 RELATING TO THE HAGUE CONVENTION OF 18
MARCH 1970 ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE ABROAD IN CIVIL OR COMMERCIAL MATTERS
(Evidence Convention) 18 (rev. 2014), https://assets.hcch.net/docs/2bdf80df-bde5-48c9-
935f-55e82db4bclc.pdf (documenting self-reported responses to letters of requests
received in 2012). For its part, the United States reported taking six months or more to
resolve most incoming letters of request. See id.
Some countries also remain wary of assisting broad, U.S.-style discovery and have
adopted reservations under the convention's Article 23 that they will not execute letters of
request "for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of documents as known in
Common Law countries." Evidence Convention, supra note 119, art. 23. Article 23 reflects
a misunderstanding of what pretrial discovery entails, however, and the Permanent Bureau
has called on member states to narrow their Article 23 reservations so as to exclude only
genuine "fishing expeditions." See PERMANENT BUREAU, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON
PRIVATE INT'L LAW, PRACTICAL HANDBOOK ON THE OPERATION OF THE EVIDENCE
CONVENTION 113-20 (2016).
123 For example, the Hague Conference consolidates information about each member
state's central authority and preferences on its website, see Authorities: 20: Convention of
18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, HAGUE
CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW, https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/
authoritiesl/?cid=82 (last visited Jan. 23, 2017); provides a standard form for requesting
evidence, see HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW, MODEL FOR LETTERS OF
REQUEST RECOMMENDED FOR USE IN APPLYING THE HAGUE CONVENTION OF 18 MARCH
1970 ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE ABROAD IN CIVIL OR COMMERCIAL MATTERS (1985),
https://assets.hcch.net/docs/e7b6b267-49e9-4e02-b84-c0780e5b65e3.pdf; an  encourages
the electronic transmission of requests and responses, see HAGUE CONFERENCE ON
PRIVATE INT'L LAW, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL
COMMISSION ON THE PRACTICAL OPERATION OF THE HAGUE SERVICE, EVIDENCE AND
ACCESS TO JUSTICE CONVENTIONS 39 (2014), https://assets.hcch.net/docs/eb709b9a-5692-
4cc8-a660-e406bc6075c2.pdf.
124 See, e.g., Abad v. Bayer Corp., 563 F.3d 663, 672 (7th Cir. 2009) (weighing third-
party evidence in Argentina as favoring dismissal without mentioning availability of the
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The Evidence Convention also helps ameliorate the second pri-
vate interest factor: the "availability of compulsory process for attend-
ance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing,
witnesses.' 125 For unwilling witnesses located in other countries, the
Evidence Convention requires foreign governments to examine wit-
nesses upon request, subject to the same measures of compulsion they
would use for domestic proceedings.126 True, these examinations may
be more limited than typical U.S.-style depositions: Questions may be
restricted, judges may do all the questioning, and a verbatim transcript
may not be prepared.12 7 As far back as 1963, however, the advisory
committee has encouraged federal judges not to exclude foreign testi-
mony on this basis.128
As for securing the testimony of willing witnesses located abroad,
technology and rule amendments have greatly reduced those costs
over the last few decades. Global air travel is increasingly cheap and
abundant.2 9 And to the extent courts were traditionally concerned
about disrupting businesses and professions through lengthy absences
of key employees,'30 modern technology-laptops, smart phones, data
plans, and ubiquitous wi-fi-enables those employees to continue
their work remotely. Second, foreign witnesses no longer have to
travel to the United States to appear at trial. Federal courthouses are
now equipped to enable teleconferences and video-linked testi-
mony,'3' and since 1996, courts may "permit testimony in open court
Evidence Convention); Vasquez v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 325 F.3d 665, 672-73 (5th
Cir. 2003) (dismissing for forum non conveniens without mentioning Mexico's adherence
to the Evidence Convention).
125 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
126 See Evidence Convention, supra note 119, arts. 3, 9, 10 (requiring that the receiving
country to apply "appropriate measures of compulsion" to the extent required by domestic
law); see also id. art. 12 (permitting refusal only where execution "does not fall within the
functions of the judiciary" or would impinge state sovereignty or security).
127 FED. R. Civ. P. 28 advisory committee's note to 1963 amendment. The Evidence
Convention, however, instructs countries to follow requested procedures unless practically
difficult or incompatible with domestic law. Evidence Convention, supra note 119, art. 9.
128 FED. R. Civ. P. 28 advisory committee's note to 1963 amendment.
129 Derek Thompson, How Airline Ticket Prices Fell 50% in 30 Years (and Why Nobody
Noticed), ATLANTIC (Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/02/
how-airline-ticket-prices-fell-50-in-30-years-and-why-nobody-noticed/273506 (explaining
that the price of domestic airfare fell by fifty percent between 1979 and 2011 while the
number of passengers tripled).
130 See supra note 109.
131 FED. JUDICIAL CTR. & NAT'L INST. FOR TRIAL ADVOCACY, EFFECrIVE USE OF
COURTROOM TECHNOLOGY: A JUDGE'S GUIDE TO PRETRIAL AND TRIAL 129, 168-74
(2001), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/CTtechOO.pdf/$file/CTtechOO.pdf
(suggesting how judges might use the technology); id. at 287-90 (listing courthouses
equipped with technology as of mid-2001). That is not to suggest this technology is a cure-
all, however. See, e.g., Iragorri v. Int'l Elevator, Inc., 203 F.3d 8, 17 (1st Cir. 2000) (voicing
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by contemporaneous transmission from a different location.1 32
Thanks to changes in technology and the rules, it is also easier and
cheaper to record depositions for later use at trial in lieu of live testi-
mony.133 Further, those depositions can be conducted remotely,
without the cost of counsel from both sides traveling to the witness's
location, as parties can now stipulate to the taking of depositions
through cheap videoconferencing platforms like Skype.134
The third private interest factor-the "possibility of [a] view of
[the] premises"1 35-is the least concerning. The need for a jury view
seldom arises in practice,136 and the ability to videotape evidence
cheaply and reliably has reduced that need even further.137 Indeed,
videotaping such evidence has additional benefits that make it poten-
tially preferable even when the evidence is local.1 38
concern that use of such technology could prevent factfinders from observing nuance in
witnesses' demeanor).
132 FED. R. Civ. P. 43(a). The advisory committee's embrace of this technology was
admittedly tentative: It prefers use of recorded depositions at trial over live transmissions,
and it did not want courts to fall back on such technology just to avoid inconveniencing
witnesses. FED. R. Civ. P. 43 advisory committee's note to 1996 amendment. Still, the
advisory committee suggested courts should allow long-distance testimony when parties
agree to its use, id., and courts have done so when witnesses were located outside the
forum state, see Davies, supra note 23, at 327-28 (collecting cases).
133 See, e.g., Bohn v. Bartels, 620 F. Supp. 2d 418, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (discounting
inability to compel some foreign witnesses to appear as a reason to dismiss because of the
availability of "alternatives to live testimony"); Davies, supra note 23, at 329-30, 330 n.83
(collecting cases). Though the Federal Rules first permitted the recording of depositions in
the 1970s, parties were not allowed to videotape depositions for later use at trial as a
matter of course until 1993. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30 advisory committee's note to 1993
amendment.
134 While parties could stipulate to the taking of depositions by telephone as early as
1980, the advisory committee broadened that permission in 1993 to cover depositions
taken by "other remote electronic means," by which it meant "satellite television" (which
now sounds quaintly antiquated). FED. R. Civ. P. 30 advisory committee's note to 1993
amendment. For examples of current practice, see, for example, United States v. One
Gulfstream G-V Jet Aircraft Displaying Tail Number VPCES, 304 F.R.D. 10, 17-18
(D.D.C. 2014) ("Ample case law recognizes that a videoconference deposition can be an
adequate substitute for an in-person deposition, particularly when significant expenses are
at issue .... "), and Hernandez v. Hendrix Produce, Inc., 297 F.R.D. 538, 541 (S.D. Ga.
2014) (ordering parties to "negotiate Skype-based depositions").
135 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
136 See, e.g., Kantakevich v. Del., L. & W.R. Co., 10 A.2d 651, 653 (N.J. Cir. Ct. 1940)
(discounting the relevance of jury views, even before Gilbert, as "a matter of discretion
which is seldom exercised or necessary").
137 See DiFederico v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 714 F.3d 796, 806 (4th Cir. 2013) (declining to
dismiss for forum non conveniens even though the physical site of a terrorist attack in
Pakistan could be relevant, given that the parties could use aerial photographs, floor plans
of the hotel, and other demonstrative aids to assist the U.S. jury); Reid-Walen v. Hansen,
933 F.2d 1390, 1398 (8th Cir. 1991) (reasoning similarly).
138 Recording preserves the evidence and allows it to become part of the record, which
means juries can review it during deliberations and appellate courts can consider it on
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On all fronts, then, transnational evidence collection is far less
burdensome today than it was even at the time of Piper. At the same
time that such evidence collection has gotten easier, however, so has
the defendant's burden for establishing hardship under these factors.
Here is another irony. The Scottish and English practices from which
these private interest factors derive were emphatic that forum non
conveniens was not about mere inconvenience, but actual injustice.
139
Scottish courts first coined the term "forum non conveniens" in the
late 1800s in reference to the longstanding concept of forum non com-
petens, or the lack of competence (jurisdiction) to hear a case.
140
"Forum non conveniens" never meant "inconvenient forum"; it trans-
lates more correctly to "inappropriate" or "unsuitable" forum.141 As
an early supporter of forum non conveniens in U.S. courts explained,
"[m]ere general allegations that witnesses and documents must be
transported from a distant state should not suffice [for dismissal],
since individuals and corporations who choose to do business in many
states will probably be put to such inconvenience wherever suit is
brought . . . . "142 Here and abroad, something more than additional
review. See Davies, supra note 23, at 345. It also allows the judge and counsel to focus the
jury on relevant evidence while excluding extraneous information, id., helping ensure that
jurors' analysis will not be colored by circumstantial factors like the cold of the warehouse
or the tedium of the drive.
139 See La Soci6t6 du Gaz de Paris v. La Soci6t6 Anonyme de Navigation "Les
Armateurs Frangais" [1926] SC 13 (HL) 19 (appeal taken from Scot.) (opinion of Lord
Shaw of Dunfermline) (stating that "the mere balance of convenience is not enough");
Logan v. Bank of Scot. (No. 2) [1906] 1 KB 141 at 151 (Eng.) ("[T]he inconvenience of
trying a case in a particular tribunal may be such as practically to work a serious injustice
upon a defendant and be vexatious," though "[t]his would probably not be so if the
difference of trying in one country rather than in another were merely measured by some
extra expense ...."); see also Barrett, supra note 59, at 406-07; Stein, supra note 23, at 796
n.46 (comparing Scottish and English standards).
140 Barrett, supra note 59, at 386-87, 387 n.35; Braucher, supra note 45, at 909.
141 See, e.g., ANDREW DEWAR GraB, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF JURISDICTION IN
ENGLAND AND SCOTLAND 212 (1926) ("The forum is then said to be inconveniens, or
unsuitable."); WILLIAM MURRAY GLOAG & ROBERT CANDLISH HENDERSON,
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF SCOTLAND 20 (1st ed. 1927) (stating that "[t]he proper
English equivalent" of conveniens is "appropriate").
142 Barrett, supra note 59, at 412-13, 421 (collecting U.S. state court cases finding long-
distance litigation to be not so burdensome as to necessitate dismissal); see also Pierce v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of U.S., 12 N.E. 858, 863 (Mass. 1887) (reasoning that a
business presumably "anticipates that the profits of the business will compensate for the
inconvenience of being held to answer" in the courts of a state where it does business);
Kantakevich v. Del., L. & W.R. Co., 10 A.2d 651, 653 (N.J. Cir. Ct. 1940) (stressing, in
refusing to dismiss case, that the "present day conveniences for travel" and the "[a]dvances
in the art of photography and the skill of engineers furnish[ ] ample facilities for a fair
presentation of the place of the occurrence").
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expense or trouble was required to sustain a plea of forum non
conveniens.
143
Not so today. Piper repeatedly emphasized that "the central
focus of the forum non conveniens inquiry is convenience.' 144 That
evolution was perhaps inevitable given the doctrine's unfortunate
choice of name, which has proven a faux ami. Regardless of the
source of the error, reverting back to the original standard of actual
injustice now would require overcoming decades of habit as well as
the intuitive (but erroneous) translation of "conveniens." The result is
that the burden for defendants has effectively been lightened at the
same time that the primary source of injustice-the infeasibility of
securing foreign evidence and testimony for use at trial-has all but
disappeared.
D. An Expectation of Foreign Defendants
That leaves Gilbert's public interest factors, which reflect the
New York state courts' focus on the administrative burdens imposed
by cases with minimal connection to the state. That public fisc ratio-
nale was limited, however, to cases where the plaintiff, defendant, and
harm were all located outside of New York-what today might be
called "foreign-cubed" cases.145 In fact, the New York courts did not
have discretion to dismiss cases that involved either a New York plain-
tiff, a New York defendant, or a non-tort cause of action: In those
cases, the New York courts reasoned, the expense and burden of a
local trial was justified.146 Shortly before Gilbert was decided, for
example, a New York state court refused to dismiss a case against a
New York company even though it involved more than a thousand
Cuban plaintiffs suing under Cuban law for unpaid wages in Cuba.
147
143 See In re Norton's Settlement [1908] 1 Ch 471 at 479, 482 (Eng.) (opinion of Vaughan
Williams, L.J.) (stating dismissal requires more than the "mere fact of increased expense of
trial"); GIBB, supra note 141, at 212 ("The inconvenience, then, must amount to actual
hardship .... ").
144 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 249 (1981); see also id. at 256 ("[Tlhe
central purpose of any forum non conveniens inquiry is to ensure that the trial is
convenient .... ).
145 This limitation is reflected in the phrasing of Gilbert's public interest factors, to
which I will return in Section lI.B.
146 See, e.g., Gregonis v. Phila. & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 139 N.E. 223, 226 (N.Y.
1923) (reversing dismissal where plaintiff was a resident of New York); Vigil v. Cayuga
Constr. Corp., 54 N.Y.S.2d 94, 97-98 (N.Y. City Ct. 1945) (holding that a domestic
corporation was subject to suit in New York even though the plaintiffs were Cuban citizens
and the cause of action arose in Cuba); Barrett, supra note 59, at 410 (noting that "New
York courts . . . will hear contract actions regardless of the residence of the parties");
Roscoe B. Gaither, Jurisdiction of Foreign Causes of Action, 66 U.S. L. Rl-v. 303, 303-04,
308-09 (1932).
147 Vigil, 54 N.Y.S.2d at 95, 98.
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Indeed, far from considering this a close case, the court found the
New York defendant's argument for dismissal "difficult to follow"
given the well-established rule that local defendants could not invoke
forum non conveniens.
1 48
The Scottish and admiralty practices were not as strictly limited
to foreign-cubed cases, but they similarly applied only to cases
involving foreign defendants. Indeed, that was the whole point:
Although the courts of Scotland and England rejected the administra-
tive concerns relied on by the New York courts,149 their focus on crip-
pling unfairness to defendants was similarly tied to the defendant's
residency. Given that local defendants were not burdened by having
to defend themselves locally, the Scottish and English courts only dis-
missed cases brought against non-resident defendants.1 50 In U.S.
admiralty practice, meanwhile, the comity and fairness concerns justi-
fying discretionary dismissals only arose in suits involving foreign
parties.1 5
1
In short, when Gilbert was decided, forum non conveniens was
limited in practice and justification to cases involving out-of-forum
defendants.152 When Piper applied forum non conveniens to dismiss a
148 Id. at 97; see also Gaither, supra note 146, at 308 (remarking on the author's
inability, in 1932, to find a New York state court case invoking forum non conveniens to
dismiss a suit against a New York defendant).
149 The Scottish, for instance, thought it "[o]bvious[ ]" that "the Court cannot allege its
own convenience, or the amount of its own business, or its distaste for trying actions which
involve taking evidence in [another language], as a ground for refusal." La Soci6t6 du Gaz
de Paris v. La Soci6t6 Anonyme de Navigation "Les Armateurs Franqais" [1926] SC 13
(HL) 21 (appeal taken from Scot.) (opinion of Sumner, L.); see also Logan v. Bank of Scot.
(No. 2) [1906] 1 KB 141 at 148-49 (Eng.) (contrasting Scottish and New York approaches
to forum non conveniens).
150 See Grossi, supra note 23, at 10 (noting that the Scottish doctrine was not applied to
domestic defendants until the late 1970s); Robertson & Speck, supra note 45, at 949 n.68
(similar). For borderline cases, see Logan, [1906] 1 KB at 142 (reporting counsel's
argument that the plaintiff had manufactured jurisdiction by naming local but nominal
defendants, specifically an individual who was judgment-proof and a local bank branch
that was not involved in the dispute); In re Norton's Settlement [1908] 1 Ch 471 at 480
(Eng.) (opinion of Vaughan Williams, L.J.) (distinguishing between domicile and residence
in staying a case brought against an Englishman who resided and worked in India); Tulloch
v. Williams (1846) 8 D 657, 657 (Scot.) (treating Scotsman who lived and worked in
Jamaica as a nonlocal defendant).
151 In 1947, for example, Robert Braucher could find no example of a court declining
jurisdiction in an admiralty case "brought by an American citizen in his own right."
Braucher, supra note 45, at 920-21; see also ROBINSON, supra note 97, at 18 ("The question
[of forum non conveniens] has most frequently been presented in suits by foreign seamen
against masters or owners of foreign vessels .... "); Bickel, supra note 82, at 46 (finding no
examples of forum non conveniens-type discretion being asserted in admiralty suits
between U.S. citizens).
152 See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 59, at 419 ("It is clear that it would be held an abuse of
discretion for a trial court to refuse to hear a suit brought in the state . . . where the
defendant has his actual domicile."); Braucher, supra note 45, at 914 (summarizing U.S.
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case against a local defendant, it broke from whatever historical roots
the doctrine could claim.
Forum non conveniens is not intrinsic to the common law.
Rather, the Gilbert Court articulated a new test woven together from
disparate practices that were themsleves of fairly recent provenance.
Gilbert was a product of its time and its circumstances, a domestic
foreign-cubed case at the dawn of deterritorialized jurisdiction. There
is a chasm between Gilbert and Piper that makes the Gilbert test
poorly suited for Piper's transnational context-much less for the con-
text of transnational itigation today. At the very least, the Gilbert test
should be reformed to exclude its application in cases involving local
defendants,'5 3 and the use of forum non conveniens in admiralty
should be broken off and returned to its pre-Gilbert roots.154 But
those would be the "easy" reforms. More difficult will be the incorpo-
ration of comity considerations for transnational cases, as well as the
downplaying of the evidentiary factors and a return to the doctrine's
original focus on injustice beyond mere inconvenience. Indeed, as the
next Part argues, those reforms may prove infeasible.155
II
THE LIMITS OF REFORM
The federal doctrine of forum non conveniens is thus poorly
designed for the transnational cases for which it is primarily used
today. But revising the test to fit transnational cases better is no
simple task. It will not be as easy as telling judges to focus less on
access to evidence, for example, or to add a new factor to address
international comity concerns. As I have developed more fully in a
companion article, complex and open-ended tests like the forum non
conveniens analysis are prone to distortion due to the accumulation of
cognitive shortcuts within the common law.156 In the context of trans-
state court practice as focused on "actions between aliens, nonresidents, and foreign
corporations and in suits involving the 'internal affairs' of foreign corporations"); Joseph
Dainow, The Inappropriate Forum, 29 li.. L. Ri-v. 867, 881 (1935) (summarizing forum
non conveniens as historically applying to suits involving "foreign parties and foreign
cause[s] of action").
153 See infra Section IV.D.
154 That doctrine may, however, need to be updated and refined. See Bickel, supra note
82, at 13 (urging reform of the admiralty doctrine).
155 Though I am skeptical that piecemeal reforms will on their own fix the shortcomings
of forum non conveniens, I nonetheless summarize what such reforms might look like
below. See infra Section IV.A.
156 See Gardner, supra note 47.
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national litigation, that distortion tends to favor local interests and dis-
favor foreign or systemic concerns, creating unintended parochial tilts
within procedural doctrines. I have argued that such "parochial pres-
sures" are indeed apparent within the lower courts' application of
forum non conveniens, which could explain the perception that the
federal courts are invoking forum non conveniens too often.157 At
root, the problem is that forum non conveniens tries to do too much,
and it does so shrouded within a double layer of judicial discretion
that allows parochial pressures more space to grow. Those funda-
mental design flaws will not be fixed-indeed, they may be exagger-
ated-by reforms that add further complexity or fight against
engrained habit. That is, the very structure of forum non conveniens
invites its overapplication, and superficial reforms will do little to
help.
This Part begins by summarizing a theory for why complex and
open-ended doctrines like forum non conveniens develop parochial
tilts over time. It then considers the specific challenge of adding
comity back into the forum non conveniens analysis, concluding that
efforts to do so have not worked and perhaps have made matters
worse. The Part concludes by considering how a complex concept like
comity may be best effectuated through procedural doctrines.
A. Doctrinal Design and Parochial Pressures
Transnational litigation is complex, both factually and legally.
Judges face institutional constraints in trying to identify, for example,
how much discovery a foreign court would permit or what a foreign
sovereign's interests are in a particular case. Those institutional con-
straints-of time and resources and information-are particularly
acute in the context of threshold procedural questions.158 Yet forum
non conveniens, a threshold procedural inquiry, asks judges to make a
whole series of complex evaluations about the availability of foreign
evidence, the level of foreign interest in a case, and the content of
foreign law. Further, those determinations are left to the judge's
broad discretion and are subject only to highly deferential review.
That fundamental combination of complexity, institutional con-
straints, and discretion will pressure the doctrine to evolve towards
excluding too many cases from U.S. courts. Such parochial pressures
can be divided into five categories.
157 See id. at 983-94 (evaluating federal practice of forum non conveniens).
158 Cf Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28
CARDozo L. REv. 1961, 1986-2001 (2007) (critiquing open-ended discretion in procedural
doctrines in light of bounded rationality, information access obstacles, and strategic
interaction effects).
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First is the pressure to "rulify. ' ' 159 There is a limit on how much
complexity even a dedicated decisionmaker can process.160 A natural
reaction to complexity is to seek out rubrics that can make open-
ended standards feel more manageable and their application more
legitimate.161 Thus even though the Gilbert Court insisted its list of
factors was not meant to be a definitive "catalogue" of considera-
tions,162 those factors have been treated as such ever since, and judges
and litigants are unlikely to stray from that list even when it proves
unhelpful.163 Further, that same Gilbert test exemplifies the difficulty
of identifying rubrics for use in transnational cases. As Part I
described, the Gilbert test is poorly suited for use in modern transna-
tional litigation: It was developed for a domestic context, its private
interest factors are outdated, and its public interest factors reflect a
rationale that no longer matches how the doctrine is used today. Yet
because that test was already familiar and in use when Piper was
decided, it would have taken much more judicial initiative (and risk)
to develop a better alternative.164 That is, the path of least resistance
in transnational procedure will typically be the use of a domestic ana-
logue, yet domestic tests will often overlook considerations that might
be critical in a transnational context.165
159 See, e.g., Michael Coenen, Rules Against Rulification, 124 YALE L.J. 644, 654-55, 654
n.26 (2014) (discussing the inherent pressure of "rulification" in common-law
decisionmaking).
160 See, e.g., Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark
Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581, 1601-02, 1601 n.88 (2006) (noting empirical studies
showing that decisionmakers, including judges, "make a decision after considering a
remarkably low number of decision-relevant factors").
161 See Frederick Schauer, The Tyranny of Choice and the Rulification of Standards, 14
J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSuES 803, 811-12 (2005) ("[H]aving too many options is frustrating
and suboptimal, and... when faced with too much choice people will seek to narrow the
range of choices by quick heuristics. We want decisional guidance, we want a smaller
number of options, and we want to have our decisional processes structured.").
162 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
163 See Abad v. Bayer Corp., 563 F.3d 663, 668 (7th Cir. 2009) (observing that, with
forum non conveniens, "because there is a list, and a list sponsored by the Supreme Court,
albeit in a case more than half a century old, parties find it difficult to resist trying to make
their case correspond to the items in the list, however violent a dislocation of reality
results"). This rulification of the Gilbert factors is perhaps a necessary consequence of the
doctrine's abuse of discretion review, discussed further infra. Appellate courts must have
some legal framework by which to measure trial judges' exercise of their discretion, and
the Gilbert factors provide such a checklist.
164 Cf. Bone, supra note 158, at 1990 n.122 ("[I]n the absence of strong feedback, a
combination of framing, the escalating commitment effect, and the egocentric bias can
cause a judge to lock into a routine set of practices even when those practices are
suboptimal or flawed.").
165 See Stephen B. Burbank, The World in Our Courts, 89 MicH. L. REV. 1456, 1459-73
(1991) (critiquing such transplantation of domestic rubrics to transnational litigation, and
vice versa); cf. BRAINERD CURRIE, On the Displacement of the Law of the Forum
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A poor choice of rubric can exaggerate the problem of mis-
calibration, the second source of parochial pressure. Miscalibration
stems from another human reaction to complexity: the use of heuris-
tics, or decisionmaking shortcuts. Two sets of heuristics in particular
can distort broad balancing tests towards unintentionally lopsided
inquiries. First, when confronting a litany of factors, decisionmakers
may "satisfice," or "consider a finite amount of information, maybe as
few as two or three factors, to reach a good enough approximation of
'correct' outcomes.' 166 In a test with ten factors, for example, it is
unlikely that all factors will be fully considered and weighed.
167
Rather, a test with many factors may lead to less optimal answers than
a test with just a few factors because judges using the complex test
may focus first on the least important factors.1 68 Second, the choice of
which factors to focus on first will be influenced by salience, "a heu-
ristic that causes decisionmakers to overweight the importance of
vivid, concrete foreground information and to underweight the impor-
tance of abstract, aggregated background information.1 69 It is human,
in other words, to start with the most familiar or concrete factors,
which will in turn have an outsized influence on the outcome.
70
The difficulty with forum non conveniens is that the most con-
crete and familiar factors-those regarding the difficulty of obtaining
evidence-are also the least relevant today.171 Yet the attention of
judges is directed first and foremost to evidentiary considerations,
which comprise the first three factors of the Gilbert test.1 72 It is not
surprising, then, that the analysis of forum non conveniens has grown
to emphasize party convenience, meaning primarily the ease by which
(critiquing the U.S. approach to conflict of laws because "[i]t requires lawyers and judges
to think and act in ways different from those to which they are disposed by training, habit
and inclination"), in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 3, 9-10 (1963).
166 Gardner, supra note 47, at 959.
167 See Beebe, supra note 160, at 1601-04 (discussing empirical studies).
168 Cf Heiner, supra note 48, at 563, 565 (explaining that "allowing greater flexibility to
react to more information or administer a more complex repertoire of actions will not
necessarily enhance an agent's performance").
169 ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 38 (2006).
170 See Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 894-96
(2006) (discussing the distorting effect of salience on common law rulemaking).
171 See supra Section I.C.
172 See, e.g., Seguros Universales, S.A. v. Microsoft Corp., 32 F. Supp. 3d 1242, 1250
(S.D. Fla. 2014) (stating that the most important private interest is the question of access to
evidence); RIGroup LLC v. Trefonisco Mgmt. Ltd., 949 F. Supp. 2d 546, 556 (S.D.N.Y.
2013) ("The first three factors are especially significant."). Indeed, in the Eleventh Circuit,
judges are required to consider the public interest factors only if the private interest factors
are in equipoise, see, e.g., Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 578 F.3d 1283,
1290, 1298 (11th Cir. 2009), with the effect that defendants' inconvenience may well be the
beginning and the end of the analysis.
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defendants can obtain discovery of foreign evidence, even as long dis-
tance evidence collection and the preservation of witness testimony
has gotten easier.173 And an emphasis on the location of evidence will
favor dismissing cases, particularly those brought by foreign plaintiffs
against U.S. defendants: At the outset of a case, it is difficult to fore-
cast what evidence will be relevant to nascent claims, which means
defendants in transnational cases can often point to some evidence
abroad that might be helpful for their defense. Judges can presume
that plaintiffs, in choosing the forum, have already taken into account
the difficulty of obtaining evidence from abroad, but they may harbor
due process-type concerns about defendants' access to evidence,
leading them to overweight defendants' vague or unsubstantiated
assertions of potential discovery problems. Further, because the alter-
native forum in Gilbert was another federal district court that would
apply equivalent procedures, the Gilbert factors do not ask judges to
consider whether the foreign forum will in fact resolve the defendant's
discovery concerns.174
If miscalibration involves the overemphasis of salient factors, its
flipside would be the marginalization of factors that are less familiar
or more difficult to ascertain. This ossification of difficult factors is the
third source of parochial pressure. When the assessment of abstract or
foreign factors strain judicial capacity, judges may instead rely on
dicta in prior opinions,175 leading to string citations that can lock in
those factors.176 Between miscalibration and ossification, reforms to
tests like forum non conveniens that add more complexity-particu-
larly more factors that are difficult to ascertain, like an evaluation of
comity interests-will not necessarily improve decisionmaking. The
focus will remain on the salient evidentiary factors, and the difficult
new factors will be addressed in general terms that will be copied from
case to case until they become rote.
That process points to the fourth source of parochial pressure: the
path dependence of the common law.177 The use of heuristics is not
173 See supra Section I.C.
174 See Davies, supra note 23, at 384 (critiquing the Gilbert factors for presupposing "the
interdistrict, intra-American context in which Gilbert and Koster were decided").
175 Cf Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The Same
Way Everybody Else Does-Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud Opinions, 51
EMORY L.J. 83, 117 (2002) ("Under conditions of complexity and uncertainty, actors who
perceive themselves as having limited information and can observe the actions of
presumptively better-informed persons may attempt to free ride by following the latter's
decisions.").
176 Cf. BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 14, at 419 (noting this pattern in the context of
the public interest factors).
177 See generally Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and
Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IowA L. REV. 601 (2001).
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inherently problematic,178 but the process of the common law means
that a poor choice of rubric or miscalibration in one case can become
amplified and entrenched across cases. This learning effect is not lim-
ited to hierarchical authority, either; district court judges routinely
consider how other district court judges have handled similar cases,
whether out of efficiency concerns, habit, reputational effects, or a
professional commitment to the consistent development of the
common law.179 This path dependence is the vehicle through which
the choice of rubrics, the miscalibration of tests, and the ossification of
difficult factors become baked into the doctrine itself.
Take, for example, Piper's caution that cases only be dismissed
for forum non conveniens when there is an adequate and available
alternative forum.180 In objective terms, gathering the relevant infor-
mation about a foreign legal system can be challenging. In subjective
terms, evaluating that information is also dicey: Judges are wary of
declaring another country's courts inadequate.181 Thus judges at times
fall back on generalized assertions of the adequacy of foreign courts,
relying in part on similar assertions made in prior decisions.182 More
178 See Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5, 29-30 (2007) (noting the importance of intuition in efficient judicial
decisionmaking).
179 As I have explained elsewhere:
Judges may follow nonbinding precedent even if it is suboptimal for any
number of reasons. First, and most fundamentally, our legal culture is deeply
committed to consistency across cases; all lawyers, including judges (and their
clerks), are trained to distill the law from prior opinions.... In social terms,
judges may overdefer to their peers' prior work because of a professional
interest in avoiding conflict with colleagues, minimizing the risk of reversal on
appeal, and conforming more broadly to the judicial consensus. Behavioral
psychology suggests that judges may stick with suboptimal prior practice due
to commitment effects, egocentric bias, or the weight of habit. In institutional
terms, judges also conserve scarce resources when they avoid reinventing the
wheel. And to the extent that precedent is binding.... the order in which cases
arise can meaningfully constrain the future development of the law ....
Gardner, supra note 47, at 960 (footnotes omitted).
180 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 n.22 (1981).
181 See, e.g., Carijano v. Occidental Petrol. Corp., 643 F.3d 1216, 1226 (9th Cir. 2011)
(voicing concern about U.S. judges appearing to condemn the sufficiency of other
countries' legal systems); Niv v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 710 F. Supp. 2d 328, 337-38
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (emphasizing that "[c]ourts must be cautious before finding incompetence
or corruption by other nation's [sic] judicial systems" and collecting cases to same effect);
Heiser, supra note 16, at 616 (noting the hesitancy of courts "to label the court system of
another country procedurally 'inadequate"'); Rutledge, supra note 19, at 1078-79 (arguing
that instead of "minimiz[ing] jurisdictional competition .... the adequacy analysis simply
worsens matters by miring courts in value-laden judgments about the acceptability or
unacceptability of a foreign forum").
182 See, e.g., Seguros Universales, S.A. v. Microsoft Corp., 32 F. Supp. 3d 1242, 1249-50
(S.D. Fla. 2014) (deeming Guatemala an adequate alternate forum); In re Air Crash near
Peixoto de Azeveda, Braz., on Sept. 29, 2006, 574 F. Supp. 2d 272, 283-85 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)
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often, judges rely on defendant waivers and stipulations to ensure that
a foreign court will be available and adequate for the plaintiff. Defen-
dants may, for example, consent to personal jurisdiction before the
foreign court, agree to accept foreign service of process, waive any
statutes of limitation defenses, and promise to provide U.S.-style dis-
covery to the plaintiff over and beyond what the foreign court might
require.183 As Professor Thomas Main has argued, those conditions
may do more to reassure the court than to protect the plaintiff, who
will have difficulty enforcing them before the foreign tribunal or else
returning to a U.S. court for further litigation if those efforts fail.
184
The use of waivers, that is, allows judges to avoid assessing difficult
questions about foreign legal systems, while their widespread use has
helped to ossify the alternative forum inquiry, under which foreign
forums are almost never found to be either inadequate or
unavailable.1
8 5
Finally, there is the added pressure created by deferential review.
The other four pressures can mount more easily within doctrines when
there is no meaningful appellate check on the development and appli-
cation of decisionmaking rubrics. In the case of forum non con-
veniens, as Judge Henry Friendly noted shortly after Piper, the
Supreme Court has shielded trial court discretion with a highly defer-
ential standard of appellate review.186 That doubled discretion hinders
doctrinal corrections that might help relieve the other parochial
pressures.
B. The Problem of Comity
As an illustration of these pressures, consider, for example, how
judges applying forum non conveniens have tried to address comity
more explicitly through the existing public interest factors. These fac-
tors were not designed to weigh positive and negative adjudicative
comity concerns, and when pressed into that service, they encourage
(same as to Brazil); see also Davies, supra note 23, at 322 (noting that some courts base
their adequacy finding on their own consideration of publicly available material).
183 See, e.g., Heiser, supra note 16, at 614-17, 615 nn.36-37, 616 n.45 (collecting cases
and commentary regarding the use of conditions); Thomas Orin Main, Toward a Law of
"Lovely Parting Gifts": Conditioning Forum Non Conveniens Dismissals, 18 Sw. J. INT'L L.
475, 480-84, 480 nn.22-23 (2012) (identifying categories of conditions, waivers, and
stipulations, and collecting cases where they have been applied).
184 See Main, supra note 183, at 479.
185 See, e.g., Walter W. Heiser, Forum Non Conveniens and Choice of Law: The Impact
of Applying Foreign Law in Transnational Tort Actions, 51 WAYNE L. REv. 1161, 1172-73
(2005); Whytock & Robertson, supra note 15, at 1457-60. For a thorough discussion of the
shortcomings in the courts' analysis of the alternative forum requirement, see generally
Samuels, supra note 33.
186 See Friendly, supra note 29, at 751-55.
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ossification that undermines any potential comity benefits. That is,
squeezing comity into the existing structure has not solved the
problem, and in some instances might make matters worse.
One possible route for addressing comity through the existing
factors is Gilbert's choice-of-law consideration: the preference for
"having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with the
state law that must govern the case, rather than having a court in some
other forum untangle problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign
to itself."'1 87 This factor, however, is not a helpful framework for ana-
lyzing adjudicative comity. First, choice-of-law analysis is a matter of
prescriptive comity: It asks which country has the greater interest in
seeing its laws applied.188 That is a different question from the ques-
tion of adjudicative comity that judges are trying to answer through
forum non conveniens: which country has the greater interest in trying
the case. Put differently, just because another sovereign's law applies
does not always mean that the sovereign would prefer the case be
heard in its own courts.1
89
Second, neither of these comity questions is actually the question
addressed by the Gilbert factor. Rather, the factor asks only how bur-
densome the choice-of-law analysis and resulting application of unfa-
miliar law would be for this forum. That is not a matter of comity, but
of administrative convenience. It is possible that prescriptive comity,
adjudicative comity, and administrative convenience may all point in
the same direction: For example, when a case presents a novel ques-
tion of foreign law that is sensitive or particularly thorny, it may be
hard for a U.S. court to discern and apply that law, and the foreign
sovereign may prefer its own courts to resolve any ambiguity.190 But
that will be the rare case. More typically, administrative concerns will
be at odds with positive comity commitments: It is a normal task of
the courts to apply foreign law as an expression of positive prescrip-
187 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 509 (1947).
188 Given the diversity of approaches to choice-of-law analysis in the United States, this
question of prescriptive comity can be phrased in different ways: for example, in terms of
which state has the most significant contacts or relationship with the dispute, or the relative
strength of each state's interest in having its laws applied, or the application of default rules
that presume state interests in regulating certain categories of conduct. See generally, e.g.,
Christopher A. Whytock, Myth of Mess? International Choice of Law in Action, 84 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 719, 724-28 (2009) (summarizing choice-of-law methodologies).
189 Lear, supra note 15, at 569-70 ("[F]orum non conveniens presents a choice of forum,
not a choice of law, problem. We are not talking about prescriptive jurisdiction, which is
the exercise of regulatory power; we are talking about the exercise of adjudicatory
power .... [A]pproaching the public interest analysis from a choice of law perspective
obscures the significant American interests at stake in the adjudication of foreign injury
claims.").
190 See, e.g., Abad v. Bayer Corp., 563 F.3d 663, 671 (7th Cir. 2009).
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tive comity,191 yet the effort required will almost always be greater
than applying U.S. law.192 That greater effort in itself is not a reason
to dismiss cases involving foreign law-yet that is precisely how this
factor has developed in many circuits.193 If judges are worried about
the comity implications of keeping or dismissing a case, they would be
better served to downplay this factor altogether.
A similar poor fit occurs when courts try to use Gilbert's local
interest factors to address comity considerations. Note that those fac-
tors are phrased quite narrowly: Gilbert was concerned about the
burden of jury duty for "a community which has no relation to the
litigation"; the "local interest in having localized controversies
decided at home"; and the need for trials that "touch the affairs of
many persons" to be held "in their view and reach rather than in
remote parts of the country where they can learn of it by report
only. ' 194 These factors assume that a case is centralized in a particular
(foreign) jurisdiction and that it has no meaningful nexus to the
chosen forum. That matches the origins of forum non conveniens and
Gilbert itself, which were focused on "foreign-cubed" cases.195 But
most cases dismissed today for forum non conveniens are not foreign-
cubed cases; rather, transnational cases will often have meaningful
connections to multiple forums, including the United States. For those
191 See DiFederico v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 714 F.3d 796, 807-08 (4th Cir. 2013)
(emphasizing that U.S. courts apply foreign law all the time and have the tools to do so);
see also Rivendell Forest Prods., Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ltd., 2 F.3d 990, 994 (10th Cir.
1993) (pointing out that Piper's balancing test would be "functionally meaningless" if the
applicability of foreign law were alone sufficient to justify dismissal).
192 See CURRIE, supra note 165, at 9 (observing that, because "[1]awyers and judges are
ordinarily schooled in their own domestic law," "[t]he intrusion of foreign law is an
unsettling departure from routine, involving even under ideal conditions some encounter
with the unfamiliar, some departure from usual procedures, some additional burden; and
there are situations in which the degree of unfamiliarity and the burden of understanding
can become oppressive").
193 See, e.g., Ford v. Brown, 319 F.3d 1302, 1307, 1310 & n.24 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting
that applicability of foreign law militates heavily in favor of the foreign forum); Logan Int'l
Inc. v. SureTech Completions (USA), Inc., No. 4:13-cv-00492, 2013 WL 3005592, at *5
(S.D. Tex. June 10, 2013) (same); Harp v. Airblue Ltd., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1078 (C.D.
Cal. 2012) (same); see also Bohn v. Bartels, 620 F. Supp. 2d 418, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(suggesting the very question that foreign law might apply weighs in favor of dismissal); cf.
Whytock, supra note 188, at 756 (finding that only half of forum non conveniens opinions
discuss choice of law, but that when they do, they are more likely both to find that foreign
law applies and to dismiss the case).
194 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947) (emphases added).
195 See supra Section I.D. As an interesting point of comparison, the admiralty courts
were traditionally more willing to dismiss suits between foreigners when both parties
shared "a common national forum," ROBINSON, supra note 97, at 14, meaning the dispute
was localized within a single foreign jurisdiction.
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cases, the local interest factors do not help judges determine when a
forum's connections to the case outweigh those of another forum.
Given the poor fit of these factors to transnational cases, judges
do not apply them literally. Instead, they have treated these factors as
a general inquiry into the countries' interests in the case. It is hard for
judges in individual cases to weigh sovereign interests,196 however,
and an unguided yet capacity-straining inquiry invites generalizations.
Thus under these factors, courts have invoked, for example, the Swiss
interest "in ensuring that conduct occurring within its borders" is
resolved by its own courts,197 or the U.S. interest "in preventing forum
shopping.' 98 Such overgeneralized interests are easy to assert but
lack analytical rigor, and the Gilbert factors provide no guidance on
how to evaluate or weigh what may well be incommensurate values.199
Rather, such generalized sovereign interests should be accounted for
ex ante in the framing of the test itself: If a governmental interest
would be true across many cases, there is no need for it to be precisely
calibrated in each case.200 By using the local interest factors to instead
query what foreign sovereigns would prefer in run-of-the-mill dis-
putes, judges have turned what were very narrow grounds for dis-
missal into an overbroad inquiry that allows for dismissal whenever
generalized foreign interests may be implicated-as they will be in
most transnational cases.
Indeed, the local interest factors might do more to promote inter-
national comity if limited to their original, narrow phrasing. That
narrow phrasing recognizes that foreign-cubed cases with minimal
connections to the chosen forum can raise negative adjudicative
comity concerns. By applying those factors more broadly, judges have
made the factors less determinate, which in turn increases judges' dis-
cretionary power to choose which generalized state interests to
196 See, e.g., Davies, supra note 23, at 374; Jack L. Goldsmith, The New Formalism in
United States Foreign Relations Law, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1395, 1415-17 (1999); Paul,
supra note 9, at 70.
197 Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 576 F.3d 1166, 1181 (10th Cir. 2009).
198 Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 578 F.3d 1283, 1298 (11th Cir. 2009).
199 Compare Reid-Walen v. Hansen, 933 F.2d 1390, 1400 (8th Cir. 1991) (asserting the
strong interest of U.S. defendant's home forum in providing "redress of injuries caused by
its citizens" and discounting Jamaica's interest in a minor tort case involving non-citizens),
with id. at 1409-10 (Timbers, J., dissenting) (emphasizing Jamaica's interest in its tourist
economy).
200 See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J.
557, 573, 577, 585 (1992) (explaining that a complex consideration that is nonetheless fairly
consistent across cases is a prototypical example of when ex ante decisionmaking (i.e.,
rules) will be most efficient).
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emphasize in individual cases.201 The result may be an undermining of
positive adjudicative comity (the willingness to hear transnational
cases) and positive prescriptive comity (the willingness to apply for-
eign law when appropriate) without any real benefit for negative adju-
dicative comity.
The existing factors, in short, do not provide the right vehicle for
assessing international comity (specifically, negative adjudicative
comity). And adding a new factor will require fighting the greater sali-
ence of the evidentiary factors as well as decades of judicial habit.
Forum non conveniens may simply not be the right vehicle for
assessing when U.S. jurisdiction reaches too far.
C. The Pursuit of Precision
To review, parochial pressures grow within doctrines that com-
bine complex or difficult inquiries (like comity) with simpler, concrete
ones (like access to evidence). Further, those pressures will be exag-
gerated by institutional constraints, which are greatest when judges
must make quick decisions based on less information-as with proce-
dural decisions. Forum non conveniens is the perfect storm of complex
inquiries, institutional constraints, and judicial discretion, which
means it is highly susceptible to distortion.
This story runs counter to the general assumption that flexible
standards can achieve greater precision in jurisdictional doctrines than
can rules. There is a recognized tradeoff in the design of such doc-
trines between efficiency and accuracy: Strict rules are easier to apply
and more predictable but risk over- or underinclusion, while flexible
standards are more difficult to apply and less predictable but allow for
closer calibration in individual cases.20 2 Professor David Shapiro, in
famously defending such flexible standards, emphasized the need for
"principled discretion"-meaning clearly articulated criteria the appli-
cation of which would encourage "the development of effective guide-
lines," all backed by a strong "principle of preference" that courts
201 Cf Stein, supra note 23, at 821-22 ("[T]o the extent that the evaluation of public
factors under [Gilbert] does constitute a substantive judgment about the extent of the
respective forums' stakes in the controversy, that judgment should be formalized and
subjected to full appellate review .... ").
202 See Brand, supra note 20, at 1010-11 (describing forum non convenien's preference
for precision over efficiency); Clermont, supra note 23, at 228 (arguing that pursuit of the
ideal forum is too costly and ultimately infeasible). Outside of academic debate, however,
jurisdictional doctrines may be inherently flexible even when phrased in terms of
absolutes. Frederic M. Bloom, Jurisdiction's Noble Lie, 61 STAN. L. REV. 971, 1006-07
(2009).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
May 2017]
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
would hear cases falling within their grant of jurisdiction.2 3 From
Shapiro's perspective, forum non conveniens is supposed to help cali-
brate jurisdiction more precisely in individual cases, narrowing in on
the optimal jurisdictional line. But that presumes judges are able to
effectively apply the given criteria20 4 and that the standard does not
evolve lopsidedly over time.205 Simply put, forum non conveniens
does not provide the needed guidance that allows for the principled
exercise of discretion.
A more effective approach might be to disaggregate a doctrine
like forum non conveniens into a series of distinct inquiries that sepa-
rate the challenging considerations from the more prosaic ones-and
that subject the challenging considerations in particular to meaningful
appellate review. This series of distinct inquiries does not need to be
comprised solely of rules. It matters most that each inquiry is simple,
at least as applied to the majority of cases.20 6 That is, either a simple
rule or a simple standard might effectively sort eighty percent of cases
without straining judicial capacity. For the smaller subset of cases that
defy sorting under that initial rule of thumb, there might be a second-
stage determination that allows for more complexity or case-by-case
balancing.20 7 By cabining that more complex determination to a
second stage of inquiry that is only reached in marginal or unusual
cases, judges can prevent those marginal or unusual cases from dis-
torting the primary inquiry in the typical case.
Put another way, instead of relying on an overarching safety valve
like forum non conveniens, we might have a series of inquiries each
with its own safety valve built into a second stage of inquiry that
judges need only reach in harder cases. By disaggregating concerns
into separate, more focused doctrines, judges are more easily able to
203 David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543, 545, 575, 578
(1985) (emphasis added).
204 See Meltzer, supra note 31, at 1912-13, 1913 n.125 (noting that "Shapiro may at
times be just a little too sanguine that judicial discretion will be exercised in a fashion that
will be conducive to predictable, stable, and relatively expeditious and efficient
decisionmaking" and voicing concern about judges' capacity to "establish a coherent
framework for the boundaries of subject matter jurisdiction" under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 in
particular). For a more optimistic view of judges' ability to apply malleable jurisdictional
doctrines, see Bloom, supra note 202, at 1011-12.
205 See generally Schauer, supra note 161, at 805-06 (describing how standards "rulify"
over time).
206 Cf Kaplow, supra note 200, at 590 (discussing tradeoffs between complexity and
simplicity as distinct from tradeoffs between rules and standards).
207 For a fuller discussion of the design of procedural inquiries, see Gardner, supra note
47, at 1006-10.
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check their intuitions in individual cases208 while avoiding the mis-
calibration and ossification that can build up within complex tests. The
result may be more accurate line-drawing in determining which trans-
national cases to keep in U.S. courts, even if it requires sacrificing the
ideal of precise calibration. The next Part considers what some of
those discrete tests might look like.
III
THE CIRCUMSCRIPTION OF TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION
In the years since Piper, the Supreme Court has been drawing a
sharper line between cases that belong in U.S. courts and cases that do
not. From personal jurisdiction to the presumption against extraterri-
toriality to the enforceability of forum selection clauses, defendants
now have multiple avenues for avoiding U.S. courts,20 9 and forum non
conveniens is becoming dangerously redundant. One solution might
be to keep forum non conveniens and to roll back the other develop-
ments. In practical terms, however, such wholesale retrenchment
seems unlikely, given the Court's broader turn towards limiting litiga-
tion.210 Forum non conveniens may be the more vulnerable target.
211
But I also think it is the right target.
I start from the premise that there are (or were) cases that do not
belong in U.S. courts: cases where the defendant has only transitory
connections to the forum,212 for instance, or where the assertion of
jurisdiction stretches the limits of international law. Such jurisdictional
overreach is not conducive to building the reciprocity and cooperation
208 Cf. Guthrie et al., supra note 178, at 3, 33 (advocating an "intuitive-override"
approach to judging, under which "judges should use deliberation as a verification
mechanism especially in those cases where intuition is apt to be unreliable").
209 See Bookman, supra note 22 (describing the rise in transnational itigation avoidance
doctrines); Burbank, supra note 50, at 664 (arguing that, based on developments in class
actions, pleading, and personal jurisdiction, "the need of foreign companies for protection
against litigation in U.S. courts is less today than it has been in decades"); Rutledge, supra
note 19, at 1070-71 (similar).
210 For descriptions and critiques of this trend, see, for example, Stephen B. Burbank &
Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 162 U. PA. L. REv. 1543
(2014); Brooke D. Coleman, The Efficiency Norm, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1777 (2015); Arthur R.
Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits: Reflections
on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286 (2013); Stephen N.
Subrin & Thomas 0. Main, The Fourth Era of American Civil Procedure, 162 U. PA. L.
REv. 1839 (2014).
211 In particular, forum non conveniens is out of step with the Court's increasing
skepticism of abstention and prudential doctrines. See infra Section IV.D.
212 Defendants accused of gross human rights violations or other conduct subject to
prosecute-or-extradite treaty obligations are an exception to this general assertion. In such
cases, universal prohibitions and multilateral treaties indicate that the exercise of
jurisdiction over transient defendants would be neither exorbitant nor unfair.
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on which private international law relies. Indeed, most other legal sys-
tems eschew the U.S. approach of overbroad jurisdiction that relies on
ad hoc, ex post, discretionary decisions to determine its actual bound-
aries.2 13 Placing some limits on the reach of U.S. laws and courts in
transnational cases can avoid retaliatory measures by other countries
and can encourage cooperation in the creation of new private law
treaties, both of which should improve private litigants' abilities to
resolve cross-border disputes overall. The question is what limits are
needed, and how best to help judges identify them.
The doctrinal developments surveyed in this Part are imperfect; I
have joined others in critiquing their excesses.21 4 But the initial
impulse behind these developments has been (in part) a concern for
international comity, and the resulting inquiries hold potential for
helping judges identify appropriate jurisdictional limits. 215 In partic-
ular, they disaggregate the comity considerations currently comingled
in forum non conveniens, which will encourage judges to analyze
those questions distinctly. Relatedly, these doctrines' more narrow
scope encourages judges to be more specific about their reasons for
dismissing transnational cases. Especially when judges are declining to
exercise their congressionally granted jurisdiction, there is value in
candor and transparency,21 6 something which forum non conveniens
lacks.2
17
213 See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont, The Role of Private International Law in the United
States: Beating the Not-Quite-Dead Horse of Jurisdiction (contrasting European and U.S.
approaches to precision in jurisdictional doctrines), in PRIVATE LAW, PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW, & JUDICIAL COOPERATION IN THE EU-US RELATIONSHIP 75,
103-05 (Ronald A. Brand & Mark Walter eds., 2005).
214 See generally Gardner, supra note 15 (critiquing the Court's most recent application
of the presumption against extraterritoriality); Anthony J. Colangelo, The Frankenstein's
Monster of Extraterritoriality Law, 110 AJIL UNBOUND 51 (2016) (same); Robin Effron,
Atlantic Marine and the Future of Forum Non Conveniens, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 693 (2015)
(critiquing the Court's insistence on the enforcement of forum selection clauses).
215 As Professor Pamela Bookman put it in her critique of the courts' litigation
isolationism, some of these recent developments have helped align U.S. practice with
international norms, "[b]ut the other half"-specifically, forum non conveniens-"get in
their way." See Bookman, supra note 22, at 1137-38.
216 See, e.g., Childress, supra note 6, at 1508 (contending judicial transparency would
promote democratic accountability); Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law
Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2381-82 (1991) (voicing concern that broad doctrines allow
judges to dismiss cases too easily without having to articulate their true reasons for doing
so); Shapiro, supra note 203, at 578-79 (arguing that clear articulation of the criteria on
which judical decisions rest permits principled judicial decisionmaking as well as principled
criticism of it).
217 See, e.g., Stein, supra note 23, at 795 (observing that under current doctrine of forum
non conveniens, "[d]ifficult and important choices about court access and governmental
interests are thus made in an informal, arbitrary, and inconsistent fashion").
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The following is a survey of major doctrinal developments that
are displacing the need for forum non conveniens as a general safety
valve. To the extent those alternative inquiries provide a better struc-
ture for limiting jurisdictional excesses-or at least are here to stay-
forum non conveniens increasingly provides defendants with an unjus-
tified second (or third or fourth) bite at the apple of dismissal.
A. Personal Jurisdiction
To the extent forum non conveniens traces its roots to the
Scottish practice, as the Supreme Court has suggested,218 that history
reflects a concern about exorbitant jurisdiction-meaning "those
classes of jurisdiction, although exercised validly under a country's
rules, that nonetheless are unfair to the defendant because of a lack of
significant connection between the sovereign and either the parties or
the dispute.'219 From this perspective, forum non conveniens was used
to dismiss cases against nonresident defendants when jurisdiction was
based on the attachment of assets unrelated to the cause of action,
220
or on transient presence,2 21 or on other tenuous territorial connec-
tions.222 Eliminate exorbitant bases of jurisdiction, and the need for
forum non conveniens-at least as derived from the Scottish tradi-
tion-is largely eliminated as well.
2 23
218 Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 449 (1994).
219 Kevin M. Clermont & John R.B. Palmer, Exorbitant Jurisdiction, 58 ME. L. REV.
473, 474 (2006).
220 See, e.g., Williamson v. Ne. Ry. Co. (1884) 11 R 596, 599 (Scot.) (opinion of Lord
Young) (expressing concerns about "actions by domiciled citizens against foreigners, or
even by foreigners against foreigners, founded on arrestments of small sums of money or
articles of small value, when the circumstances out of which the action has arisen have no
connection whatever with this country"); see also GIBH, supra note 141, at 224-25 (noting
the Scottish courts were more open to pleas of forum non conveniens when jurisdiction
was founded on attachment).
221 See, e.g., Union City Transfer v. Fields, 199 So. 206, 207-08 (La. Ct. App. 1940)
(noting the court's power to decline jurisdiction in foreign-cubed cases where jurisdiction
was based on personal service on defendant while temporarily in the state); Egbert v. Short
[1907] 2 Ch 205 at 210, 212 (Eng.) (stressing when dismissing action that defendant was
served while on vacation in England and on the eve of his return to India).
222 See, e.g., Pietraroia v. N.J. & H.R. Ry. & Ferry Co., 91 N.E. 120, 121 (N.Y. 1910)
(excoriating plaintiff for "fraud or collusion" in using partial proceeds of a bank account o
create a merely "technical, or colorable, right to maintain the action" in New York courts);
Logan v. Bank of Scot. [1906] 1 KB 141 at 145, 148 (Eng.) (refusing to take into account a
nominal local defendant who was a bankrupt or a local bank branch that had no
connection to the dispute).
223 A case currently pending before the Supreme Court may further remove the
historical need for forum non conveniens. The rise of forum non conveniens in both state
and federal courts was linked to plaintiff-side forum shopping in cases under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act (FELA), which was long interpreted as allowing plaintiffs a
broad choice of state or federal forum in which to bring their suits. See PURCELL, supra
note 64, at 223, 235-36. If the Court were to side with petitioners in BNSF Ry. Co. v.
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When the Supreme Court decided Piper in 1981, exorbitant exer-
cises of jurisdiction were still very possible,224 and "forum non con-
veniens became the vehicle by which [the Court] could trim back
excessive assertions of jurisdiction by United States courts in cases
against foreign companies" in particular.225 Since then, however, the
Court has significantly circumscribed the scope of general jurisdiction
and clarified the limits on specific jurisdiction as well.
Most notably, in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v.
Brown226 and Daimler A G v. Bauman,227 the Court narrowed general
jurisdiction to the one (or very few) districts where a defendant is
"essentially at home. ' 228 For many corporate defendants, this has
reduced their susceptibility to suit from just about everywhere
2 29 to
only the forums where they are incorporated and perhaps where they
have their principal place of business.2 30 In particular, foreign corpo-
rations may no longer be susceptible to the general jurisdiction of any
U.S. court.231 While Goodyear and Daimler assuredly make it harder
for plaintiffs to establish personal jurisdiction over foreign corpora-
tions,232 they also addressed one of the few remaining bases of exorbi-
tant jurisdiction in U.S. law.233 Indeed, the Court in Daimler was self-
conscious about the systemic implications of its decision for transna-
tional litigation. Justice Ginsburg, writing for a nearly unanimous
Court, emphasized the "risks to international comity" that arise when
Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 810 (2017) (No. 16-405), the number of forums in which plaintiffs could
bring FELA claims may be dramatically reduced, obviating a major historical impetus for
the recognition of forum non conveniens.
224 To put the timing into context, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286 (1980), had been decided just the year before, and the reigning case on general
jurisdiction was still Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
225 Rutledge, supra note 19, at 1068.
226 564 U.S. 915 (2011).
227 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
228 Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919.
229 See Linda J. Silberman, "Two Cheers" for International Shoe (and None for Asahi):
An Essay on the Fiftieth Anniversary of International Shoe, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 755,
765 (1995) (describing how, in the mid-1990s, "[n]ationwide corporations with general
operations in all states are suable everywhere").
230 See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760.
231 See Burbank, supra note 50, at 671 & n.35 (noting differential impact of Goodyear
on U.S. versus foreign corporations); Rutledge, supra note 19, at 1074 (concluding that
forum non conveniens "would [now] appear to be of limited use to foreign defendants who
already have firmer protections as a result of Goodyear and Nicastro").
232 See Bookman, supra note 22, at 1092 & n.63 (collecting cases).
233 See Clermont & Palmer, supra note 219, at 477 (listing "doing business" general
jurisdiction, along with transient ("tag") jurisdiction and attachment jurisdiction, as
exorbitant bases of jurisdiction under U.S. law); see also, e.g., OSCAR G. CHASE ET AL.,
CIVIL LITIGATION IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXT 526-27 (Oscar G. Chase & Helen
Hershkoff eds., 2007) (critiquing general jurisdiction doctrine pre-Goodyear and pre-
Daimler as broader and more indeterminate than that recognized by any other country).
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other allies, particularly the European Union, "do not share the
[same] uninhibited approach to personal jurisdiction," and she wor-
ried that an open-ended understanding of general jurisdiction had hin-
dered negotiations for a new treaty on reciprocal enforcement of
judgments, discouraged foreign investors, and generated international
friction.2
34
In addition to the comity benefits of circumscribing general juris-
diction, the design of the inquiry set forth in Daimler is also preferable
to the more wide-ranging approach it replaced. First, the initial ques-
tion judges are now to ask-where is an individual domiciled, or
where is a company incorporated or where is its principal place of
business235-usually has an "easily ascertainable" answer.236 Second,
the Court did leave open an exception (albeit a very narrow one)
allowing for the possibility that "a corporation's operations in a forum
other than its formal place of incorporation or principal place of busi-
ness may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corpo-
ration at home in that State.' 237 That exception retains a role for
judicial discretion in extraordinary cases. By framing that exception so
narrowly, however, the Court may succeed in preventing those
extraordinary cases from re-expanding the primary inquiry. Finally, in
exchange for this restrictive move, the Court could insist that general
jurisdiction "afford[s] plaintiffs recourse to at least one clear and cer-
tain forum in which a corporate defendant may be sued on any and all
claims. ' 238 In other words, when a plaintiff sues a corporate defendant
in its home forum, that defendant should not be able to argue via
forum non conveniens that a local trial would nonetheless be unfair.
In contrast, the Court's jurisprudence on specific jurisdiction
remains more muddled. Still, developments since 1981 have checked
exorbitant invocations of specific jurisdiction as well. The Court has
signaled, for instance, that defendants should not be swept up into the
jurisdiction of a U.S. court (whether state or federal) simply because
they participate in the global economy. In Walden v. Fiore,39 the
Court unanimously reaffirmed that a forum does not have jurisdiction
over a defendant based solely on the plaintiff's residency;240 the
defendant himself must do something to establish contacts within the
state. What constitutes sufficient contacts is still a source of division at
234 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 763.
235 Id. at 760-61.
236 Id. at 760.
237 Id. at 761 n.19.
238 Id. at 760.
239 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014).
240 Id. at 1119.
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the Court, as the fractured set of opinions in . McIntyre Machinery,
Ltd. v. Nicastro241 demonstrates. But after Nicastro, it seems that a
majority of the Court will not accept a pure stream-of-commerce
theory of personal jurisdiction, at least in transnational cases.
242
Further, the Court has emphasized, again in the context of trans-
national cases, that whatever constitutes minimum contacts with a
forum must also be reasonable in a given case. In Asahi Metal Industry
Co. v. Superior Court,243 Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court
delineated a set of fairness factors meant to ensure the reasonableness
of assertions of jurisdiction over foreign defendants in particular.
244
These fairness factors-which include concerns like the "unique bur-
dens placed upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal
system" and "the procedural and substantive policies of other nations
whose interests are affected by the assertion of jurisdiction"
245 -
overlap significantly with forum non conveniens.246 And like forum
non conveniens, they have been criticized by courts and commenta-
tors alike for being too difficult to apply, too uncertain, and too malle-
able.247 To the extent these fairness factors overlap with the forum
non conveniens inquiry, it does not make sense to evaluate them
twice.248 The better path forward might be to scrap the forum non
conveniens approach and to focus instead on updating and narrowing
Asahi's fairness factors, a move which the Court may be ready to
consider.
249
241 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
242 See Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 888-89 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 908 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
243 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
244 See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113.
245 Id. at 114-15 (emphasis omitted).
246 See, e.g., Bloom, supra note 202, at 986; Paul R. Dubinsky, Is Transnational
Litigation a Distinct Field? The Persistence of Exceptionalism in American Procedural Law,
44 STAN. J. INT'L L. 301, 324 (2008).
247 See, e.g., Leslie W. Abramson, Clarifying "Fair Play and Substantial Justice": How
the Courts Apply the Supreme Court Standard for Personal Jurisdiction, 18 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 441, 446 (1991) (referring to lower courts' criticism of the fairness factors for
lack of direction or predictability); Dubinsky, supra note 246, at 327 (arguing that the
Asahi factors devolve into "intuition, [other] easy-to-measure variables, and a
preoccupation with whether the defendant will be unduly burdened by having to defend
litigation in the forum"). This development is not surprising, as the fairness factors are
susceptible to many of the parochial pressures discussed above. See supra Section H.A.
248 See Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Salvation and the Hague Treaty, 85 CORNELL
L. REV. 89, 119 (1999) (contending forum non conveniens adds "[n]ot much" to the
reasonableness test).
249 Eight justices in Daimler rejected the importation of the fairness factors into the
general jurisdiction inquiry because "[i]mposing such a checklist in cases of general
jurisdiction would hardly promote the efficient disposition of an issue that should be
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From the perspective of procedural design, that approach could
have several benefits. First, unlike forum non conveniens, the specific
jurisdiction inquiry is subjected to meaningful appellate review.2 50
Second, the fairness factors are typically addressed at a second stage
of inquiry251: Most questions of personal jurisdiction can be largely
resolved based on minimum contacts, and only in the marginal cases
do decisions turn on this more open-ended balancing test. That con-
trasts with the initial wide-ranging inquiry of forum non conveniens,
the breadth of which enables parochial pressures to distort the doc-
trine more easily. Third, the personal jurisdiction inquiry focuses
judges' attention on the question of defendant fairness. That focus is
preferable to the amalgamated inquiry of forum non conveniens,
which weakens judges' focus on any one question and thus has
allowed the inquiry into defendant fairness to become diluted into a
concern for mere inconvenience.
Still, to the extent that personal jurisdiction inquiries are rooted
in constitutional doctrine, there is always a risk that any distortion of
the fairness factors due to parochial pressures will become entrenched
beyond the reach of legislative correction. The preferable approach,
then, might be two-fold: revise and simplify the fairness factors to
better match judges' institutional capacity while encouraging legisla-
tures to adopt jurisdictional statutes that stop short of constitutional
limits.2 52 If determining the scope of personal jurisdiction in transna-
tional cases based on statutory language, judges need not go looking
for safety valves for excessive jurisdiction either in constitutional doc-
trines or amorphous powers like forum non conveniens.
B. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
Personal jurisdiction doctrine, then, is starting to set some clearer
limits on the reach of U.S. adjudicative jurisdiction. Meanwhile, the
Court has set clearer limits on the reach of U.S. prescriptive jurisdic-
resolved expeditiously at the outset of litigation," suggesting a general discomfort with the
unwieldiness of the factors. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 762 n.20 (2014).
250 See, e.g., Clermont, supra note 248, at 119 (critiquing forum non conveniens as
redundant with personal jurisdiction yet subject only to "nondeferential appellate review"
on top of "various presumptions and weights that can skew that [trial court] discretion
away from fairness").
251 Although Asahi demonstrates that these two steps need not always be addressed in
sequential order, the Court nonetheless conceives of specific jurisdiction as a two-stage
inquiry where the reasonableness assessment follows after a determination of minimum
contacts has been made. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762 n.20.
252 See Clermont, supra note 213, at 100-01, 107 (explaining the benefits of a legislative
approach). One vehicle for spurring such legislation would be an international treaty on
jurisdiction and judgment enforcement, which is discussed below in Section IV.E.
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tion through its reinvigoration of the presumption against
extraterritoriality.
The presumption against extraterritoriality did not exist in its
modern form when Piper was decided in 1981. Though considered a
"longstanding principle of American law," 253 the presumption had
fallen into disuse after the 1940s; the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law, published in 1987, did not even bother to include it.254
The Court rediscovered the presumption in the 1990s, however, and
has since invoked it repeatedly in transnational cases to limit the reach
of U.S. statutes.255 This modern presumption is not the same as its
progenitor; it was reborn a stricter and more structured inquiry.
256
Under the modern presumption, judges engage in a two-step
inquiry to evaluate the geographic scope of federal statutes.25 7 At step
one, the judge looks for Congress's "clear indication of [the statute's]
extraterritorial effect. ' 258 If the judge does not find such an indication,
then the judge continues to step two, in which she determines the
"focus" of the statute.259 Just because a case has some domestic
aspects, the Court has cautioned, does not mean the nonextrater-
ritorial statute will apply to it.260 Rather, the domestic elements must
align with the statute's "focus" for the case to fall within the domestic
statute's ambit.
The benefit of the modern presumption is that it provides a struc-
tured method for evaluating the reach of U.S. statutes-a method
that, at least in part, is rooted in a concern for negative prescriptive
253 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
254 See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: JURISDIcTION § 203 reporters' note 1, at 27 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2,
2016) (noting its prior omission).
255 See, e.g., RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016) (RICO);
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (Alien Tort Statute); Morrison v.
Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010) (§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act);
Aramco, 499 U.S. 244 (Title VII).
256 See, e.g., John H. Knox, A Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality, 104 AM. J.
INT'L L. 351, 374 (2010) ("In the early 1990s, the Court dramatically strengthened the
presumption against extraterritoriality, applying it more broadly and more strictly than
before.").
257 See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255, 266; see also RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101
(reiterating and applying Morrison's two-step inquiry). For further discussion of the two-
step framework, see generally William S. Dodge, The Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality in Two Steps, 110 AJIL UNBOUND 45 (2016).
258 RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2100.
259 Id. at 2101.
260 See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266-67 ("[T]he presumption against extraterritorial
application would be a craven watchdog indeed if it retreated to its kennel whenever some
domestic activity is involved in the case.").
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comity.261 But the modern presumption is plagued by its unfinished
business. So far the Court has only articulated what judges should do
when they determine at step one that a statute does not apply extra-
territorially. But how are judges to interpret statutes that do include a
"clear indication of extraterritorial effect"?262 The majorities in
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.263 and RJR Nabisco, Inc. v.
European Community264 avoided this harder question by applying the
presumption too strictly, engaging in interpretive acrobatics to find
that the statutes at issue did not apply extraterritorially.265 As I have
argued elsewhere, this insistence on answering the step one inquiry in
the negative-on finding that statutes do not apply extraterritorially-
ends up eviscerating the presumption's justification as a search for
congressional intent.2 66 As a result, even when Congress does intend
statutes to apply extraterritorially,267 the courts may be wary of recog-
nizing that intent because the Supreme Court has not yet articulated
how to interpret the scope of such statutes.
Just because a statute applies extraterritorially does not mean
that its reach is boundless, however. There are at least two possible
limits on extraterritorial laws that the courts could develop further.
The clearest outer limit, as both Justice Breyer and Justice Scalia have
suggested, is the constraint on prescriptive jurisdiction set by interna-
tional law.268 Under international law, a nation's lawmaking powers
261 See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454-55 (2007) (describing
the presumption as recognizing that "United States law governs domestically but does not
rule the world"). It is possible to recognize this general benefit without agreeing with the
Court's application of the presumption in individual cases.
262 The RJR Nabisco Court clearly rejected the use of Morrison's step-two "focus"
inquiry for this distinct question, but it did not indicate how the question should be
analyzed instead. See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101 ("The scope of an extraterritorial
statute thus turns on the limits Congress has (or has not) imposed on the statute's foreign
application, and not on the statute's 'focus."').
263 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
264 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016).
265 See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 15, at 138-41 (critiquing the RJR Nabisco majority's
strained interpretation of RICO).
266 See id. at 139-43 (arguing that RJR Nabisco's presumption is not earnestly calculated
to give effect to congressional intent); see also Colangelo, supra note 214, at 51-55 (raising
similar concerns); Pamela K. Bookman, Doubling Down on Litigation Isolationism, 110
AJIL UNBOUND 57, 61 (2016) ("[I]t is . . . hard to argue that the presumption tracks
congressional intent when it keeps raising the hurdle that Congress must clear in order to
rebut it."); Lea Brilmayer, The New Extraterritoriality: Morrison v. National Australia
Bank, Legislative Supremacy, and the Presumption Against Extraterritorial Application of
American Law, 40 Sw. L. REv. 655, 664 (2011) (raising similar concern after Morrison).
267 Zachary D. Clopton, Replacing the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 94 B.U.
L. REv. 1, 14-15 (2014) (discussing congressional overrides of Morrison and Aramco,
among others).
268 See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1673-74 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment); Hartford
Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 815-18 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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are limited to five jurisdictional bases: conduct that takes place on its
territory (or on ships flying its flag), conduct that is committed by its
citizens, conduct that harms its citizens, conduct that harms its security
interests, or conduct that contravenes universal prohibitions.2 69 Under
the Charming Betsy canon,2 70 unless Congress clearly indicates its
intent to legislate beyond these international limits, judges should
treat those limits as hard stops on the reach of U.S. laws.
271
Even if the exercise of lawmaking power is permissible under
international law, however, it may still provoke controversy: The
closer one approaches to the international legal limits on lawmaking
power, the more likely one will cause consternation among nations
whose core jurisdictional prerogatives-such as their own territorial
jurisdiction-are affected.272 Enter the Court's admittedly vague gui-
dance in F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A.273 that judges
should construe an extraterritorial statute's reach "to avoid unreason-
able interference with the sovereign authority of other nations.
'274
One way to read Empagran is as suggesting an intermediate canon of
interpretation, short of Charming Betsy's clear statement require-
ment, that warns judges to be wary of interpreting statutes as reaching
right up to jurisdictional limits under international aw. That is, when
the exercise of U.S. prescriptive jurisdiction becomes attenuated
under international law and when it overlaps significantly with other
countries' core jurisdictional prerogatives, judges should look more
searchingly for clues from Congress about the statute's intended
scope.275
269 For the standard account, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAw OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 402, 404 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
270 See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) ("[A]n act
of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains .... ."); see also RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES: JURISDICTION § 205 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative
Draft No. 2, 2016) (describing canon as directing courts, "[wihere fairly possible," to
"construe federal statutes to avoid conflict with international law governing jurisdiction to
prescribe").
271 Cf Clopton, supra note 267, at 22-29 (arguing that the presumption against
extraterritoriality should be replaced in civil litigation by an emphasis on the Charming
Betsy canon).
272 See Maggie Gardner, Channeling Unilateralism, 56 HARV. INT'L L.J. 297, 303-06
(2015) (describing controversial margins of traditional bases of jurisdiction).
273 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
274 Id. at 164.
275 1 develop this argument more fully in Gardner, supra note 15, at 145-50. Cf.
RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES:
JURISDICTION § 204 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2016) (proposing, in addition
to the presumption against extraterritoriality, that "U.S. courts may interpret federal
statutory provisions to include other limitations on their applicability as a matter of
prescriptive comity" in order "[t]o avoid unreasonable interference with the legitimate
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There is a middle ground, then, between the Kiobel and RJR
Nabisco majorities' cramped interpretations of statutes based on an
overly strict presumption, on the one hand, and a litigation free-for-all
that requires forum non conveniens as an ad hoc safety valve, on the
other.2 76 If the presumption is refined,2 77 it may be a more promising
tool than forum non conveniens for analyzing questions of prescrip-
tive comity. Compared to forum non conveniens's amorphous, undi-
rected, and unaccountable inquiry,278 the presumption provides
analytical structure, meaningful routes of review, and the potential for
a more focused and nuanced consideration of prescriptive comity. But
if the presumption is not refined, its current strictness still makes
forum non conveniens dangerously redundant. After last Term's RJR
Nabisco, the presumption is poised to exclude more transnational
cases than is necessary to implement negative prescriptive comity.
279
This overcorrection displaces the need for an ad hoc safety valve like
forum non conveniens, which only risks closing the courthouse door
further without providing any additional benefit.
sovereign authority of other states"); Knox, supra note 256, at 353 (suggesting a similar
approach pre-Morrison, though he would interweave this inquiry with the initial
presumption against extraterritoriality, a route which Morrison may not have left open).
276 While the minority opinions in RJR Nabisco and Kiobel offered more reasonable
interpretations of the statutes at issue in those cases (concluding that they did apply
extraterritorially), they also invoked forum non conveniens to ensure that the
extraterritorial statutes would not have unlimited scope. See RJR Nabisco, Inc. v.
European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2115 (2016) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part, and dissenting from the judgment); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct.
1659, 1674 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Daimler AG v.
Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 771 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment) (similarly
invoking forum non conveniens as an alternative to the narrowing of general jurisdiction).
277 On the need for refinement, see, for example, William S. Dodge, Loose Canons:
International Law and Statutory Interpretation in the Twenty-First Century ("The Court's
extraterritoriality jurisprudence seems likely to remain a mess for some time."), in
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 547, 551 (David L. Sloss et al. eds.,
2011); Anthony J. Colangelo, Kiobel: Muddling the Distinction Between Prescriptive and
Adjudicative Jurisdiction, 28 MD. J. INT'L L. 65, 66-67 (2013) (arguing that Kiobel made
the law on the presumption against extraterritoriality "contradictory and, thus,
incoherent").
278 Cf. Brief of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Respondents at 36, Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247
(2010) (suggesting forum non conveniens is inadequate to address prescriptive comity
because its "ad hoc, case-by-case approach generates too much unpredictability of
outcome to provide the reasonable certainty that capital markets need and to protect a
sovereign's right to decide what legal and regulatory regime should apply to actions and
consequences within its territory").
279 Indeed, the foreign states who were the plaintiffs in RJR Nabisco saw no negative
prescriptive comity problem in that case, but rather a positive adjudicative comity concern
that they have access to U.S. courts to stop U.S. companies from engaging in conduct on
U.S. territory that was causing them harm abroad.
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C. Forum Selection Clauses
When Gilbert was decided, both federal and state courts gener-
ally considered forum selection clauses to be unenforceable.280 The
Supreme Court in 1972 marked the beginning of a sea change in U.S.
law when it encouraged federal courts sitting in admiralty to enforce
forum selection clauses in contracts between sophisticated parties.28'
Notably, the Court in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. 282 framed
this shift in doctrine as a matter of international commerce and coop-
eration-in other words, of comity. As the Court explained, "[w]e
cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and international
waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in
our courts.
28 3
When Piper was decided, however, it was not yet clear how far
the enforceability of such clauses extended beyond the facts of The
Bremen. The answer, it turns out, is "very far." The Court has
expressed a similar solicitude for forum selection clauses that arise in
diversity cases284 and clauses included in contracts of adhesion.
285
Indeed, under the Court's most recent holding in Atlantic Marine
Construction Co. v. U.S. District Court,286 forum selection clauses pre-
sumptively require federal courts to send cases to the party-selected
forum, whether federal, state, or foreign.287 Enforcing such clauses,
the Court has explained, protects party autonomy and avoids dis-
rupting "parties' settled expectations.
'28
These cases have gone further than necessary; the interests the
Court identified in The Bremen-both party fairness and international
comity-can be achieved without enforcing forum selection clauses in
contracts of adhesion, for example. Nonetheless, some willingness to
280 See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972) ("Forum-selection
clauses have historically not been favored by American courts."); Kurt H. Nadelmann,
Comment, Choice-of-Court Clauses in the United States: The Road to Zapata, 21 AM. J.
Comp. L. 124, 124 (1973) (heralding The Bremen as a significant shift in doctrine).
281 See The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10, 12-13, 15.
282 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
283 Id. at 9.
284 See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 28-29 (1988) (interpreting
§ 1404(a) as requiring district courts to take forum selection clauses into account in
diversity cases even if the local state court would not).
285 See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593, 597 (1991) (holding forum
selection clauses in contracts of adhesion are not per se unenforceable).
286 134 S. Ct. 568 (2013).
287 Id. at 575, 580. The Court has shown similar solicitude for arbitration agreements,
urging enforcement of class arbitration waivers even in contracts of adhesion, see AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011), and even when such waivers make
the enforcement of federal statutory rights impossible, see Am. Express Co. v. Italian
Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013) (citing Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 344).
288 Atd. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 583.
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enforce parties' choice of forum agreements, at least in arm's-length
negotiations, does help ensure fairness to defendants and reciprocal
respect for foreign courts without the need for forum non conveniens.
The difficulty, however, is that the Court has linked the general
enforceability of forum selection clauses with the use of forum non
conveniens. In Atlantic Marine, the Supreme Court unanimously held
that forum selection clauses pointing to another federal district should
almost always be enforced and that the proper vehicle for doing so is
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), the venue transfer statute.289 For forum selection
clauses pointing to a nonfederal forum (whether state or foreign), the
Court indicated judges should use forum non conveniens instead.290
There are (at least) two problems with this approach.
291
First, it raises significant questions about the source of federal
judicial power to enforce forum selection clauses. The Supreme Court
had previously held that state laws blocking the enforcement of forum
selection clauses were displaced by § 1404(a) because such a strict
state rule would conflict with § 1404(a)'s "flexible and multifaceted
analysis" for venue transfer.292 That is, the congressional directive of
§ 1404(a) requires federal judges to be able to at least consider the
presence of a forum selection clause when evaluating a motion to
transfer venue.2 93 As Professor Robin Effron has argued, however,
the Atlantic Marine Court went much further when it insisted that
forum selection clauses should presumptively be enforced, even in
diversity cases, via § 1404(a), which overrides § 1404(a)'s "flexible and
multifaceted analysis" that was the very basis for displacing state law
in the first place.2 94 As a result, the Court's current insistence on
enforcing forum selection clauses exists in a twilight space between
state law and congressional policy; it is, in other words, a judicial fiat.
Worse, when forum selection clauses point to a different sovereign's
courts, Atlantic Marine told judges to enforce such clauses through
invocation of forum non conveniens, which lacks § 1404(a)'s legisla-
tive pedigree. In the transnational context, then, forum selection
clauses are being enforced through an unacknowledged federal
common law of contracts via a judge-made doctrine that itself lacks a
clear source of authority.
289 Id. at 575.
290 Id. at 580.
291 The following discussion leans heavily on Professor Robin Effron's insightful
analysis of Atlantic Marine. See Effron, supra note 214.
292 See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 31 (1988).
293 See id. ("The forum-selection clause . . . should receive neither dispositive
consideration ... nor no consideration.").
294 See Effron, supra note 214, at 697-702, 713-15; see also Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
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Second, the Court effectively rewrote both the § 1404(a) analysis
and forum non conveniens in order to ensure the consistent enforce-
ment of forum selection clauses.295 Under the Atlantic Marine
approach to both § 1404(a) and forum non conveniens, there is no
presumption in favor of the plaintiff's choice of forum, and the forum
selection clause overrides any other private interest factor.296 In
Effron's words, this results in "balancing tests in which nothing is
being balanced, multifactor tests in which the 'practical result' is that
courts may consider only one factor, and authorizations of judicial dis-
cretion in which the district judge has the discretion to come to but
one conclusion: enforcing the forum-selection clause.'297
Congress could fix this problem by ratifying and implementing
the new Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements,298 which
is now in force.299 That congressional move would provide the federal
courts with both a procedural and a substantive basis for enforcing
forum selection clauses in many transnational cases.300 Efforts to
ratify the convention have stalled, rather ironically, on the insistence
of the Uniform Law Commission that the convention not be imple-
mented solely through federal legislation301-but that federalism-
based critique may be missing that the status quo is no better for state
interests, and might well be worse.
D. Managing Transnational Litigation
Beyond these larger doctrinal developments, judges have always
had other tools for addressing party fairness and international comity
concerns in individual cases without needing to resort to forum non
conveniens. Foreign sovereign interests, for example, can be
accounted for through immunity doctrines and the act of state doc-
295 See Effron, supra note 214, at 717-18. This collapsing of the doctrine is in addition to
the Court's elision of the differences it had previously recognized between the § 1404(a)
analysis and forum non conveniens. See id. at 702-05.
296 See Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 583 n.8.
297 Effron, supra note 214, at 718 (quoting Atd. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 582).
298 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294.
299 See Status Table 37: Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements,
HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW, https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conven
tions/status-table/?cid=98 (last updated June 2, 2016).
300 Notably, the convention excludes contracts related to family law, employment law,
and consumer law. Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 298,
art. 2. Thus, for example, it would likely not require the enforcement of forum selection
clauses in contracts of adhesion.
301 For a critical account of such a "cooperative federalism" approach to implementing
the convention, see, for example, Burbank, supra note 122, at 639-44.
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trine.30 2 And even before Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly30 3 and
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,30 4 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) pro-
vided judges with means to address frivolous or harassing claims.30 5
Further, in addition to all of these threshold determinations, the
ability of district court judges to control the scope, shape, and progress
of litigation should not be underestimated. From scheduling confer-
ences to discovery management, more mundane procedural tools
allow judges flexibility to address concerns currently lumped into the
forum non conveniens analysis, particularly those related to defendant
convenience and docket congestion. For example, consider a judge
who is concerned that a U.S. defendant will be disadvantaged by the
amount of the plaintiff's evidence located abroad. Rather than dismiss
the case outright for forum non conveniens, she might require the
plaintiff to bear the cost of translation, or provide the defendant with
more time to seek discovery under the Evidence Convention, or lev-
erage the threat of sanctions if the plaintiff does not make a good faith
effort to make the foreign evidence available. Similarly, from the per-
spective of judicial administration, the Ninth Circuit long ago recog-
nized that "[t]he forum non conveniens doctrine should not be used as
a solution to court congestion; other remedies, such as placing reason-
able limitations on the amount of time each side may have to present
evidence, are more appropriate. ,306 Such pragmatic uses of procedure
can make complex cases more manageable and burdens on parties
easier to bear.
In sum, federal judges today have a range of inquiries that
address comity and fairness concerns more directly and more thought-
fully than forum non conveniens. The need for such a rough tool for
checking excessive jurisdictional reach has passed.
302 See Koh, supra note 216, at 2392-93 (listing "foreign sovereign immunity, head-of-
state immunity, diplomatic immunity, [and] the foreign sovereign compulsion defense" as
well as the act of state doctrine as more tailored doctrinal avenues for addressing comity
than "blanket deference to foreign sovereignty").
303 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
304 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
305 See Dodson, supra note 33, at 134 (suggesting, based on empirical research, that
Twombly and Iqbal "may be legitimizing a practice by some district judges to dismiss
claims that, while not technically legally insufficient, struck the judge as so doubtful or
unlikely that the judge thought justice might be served by dismissing them anyway"); cf.
Koh, supra note 216, at 2383 (invoking Rule 12(b)(6), even before Twombly and Iqbal, to
address judicial concerns in lieu of overbroad avoidance doctrines).
306 Gates Learjet Corp. v. Jensen, 743 F.2d 1325, 1337 (9th Cir. 1984).
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IV
ROUTES TO RETIREMENT
The last three Parts have argued that forum non conveniens is
detached from its historical roots, poorly designed for its current pur-
pose, and increasingly redundant. Meanwhile, scholarly critiques have
mapped the doctrine's costs, from a breakdown in international reci-
procity to access-to-justice gaps, uncertainty for businesses, and the
aggrandizement of judicial power.30 7 The doctrine has become more
trouble than it is worth. There remains, however, the practical ques-
tion of how to bring its era to a close. Realistically, the current
Supreme Court is not poised to jettison any doctrine that helps limit
litigation.308 Rather, if anything, the Court has been embedding the
myth of forum non conveniens more deeply into federal practice, cat-
egorizing it as an inherent judicial power as recently as last Term.30 9
The retirement of forum non conveniens will instead be gradual;
it will end not with a bang but with a whimper. This Part, in a mix of
prediction and prescription, maps five routes for easing forum non
conveniens into retirement. First, it describes doctrinal reforms that
judges can adopt in the short term to make forum non conveniens a
more limited and useful tool. While I am skeptical that reform efforts
on their own will fix the problems of the current test, they provide an
interim option for concerned judges. Second, it calls on the courts,
including the Supreme Court, to avoid invoking forum non con-
veniens too lightly, a shift that may open more space for the reasoned
elaboration of other critical doctrines. Third, it encourages the courts
and Congress to continue developing alternative tools that can better
help judges divine the appropriate dividing line between cases that
belong in U.S. courts and cases that do not. Fourth, it encourages the
Supreme Court and Congress to restrict the application of forum non
conveniens in the federal courts, specifically by excluding its use in
cases arising under federal question jurisdiction and in cases involving
U.S. defendants. Fifth, it considers the most likely impetus for the doc-
trine's ultimate retirement: the negotiation of a new Hague treaty on
the reciprocal enforcement of judgments.
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A. Consolidating Doctrinal Reform
Though lower court judges remain bound by Piper, they can
nonetheless nudge forum non conveniens toward a more modern and
helpful design.
310
First, judges can reinvigorate the initial presumption in favor of
exercising jurisdiction by requiring defendants to show that the for-
eign forum would be demonstrably better suited to hear the case.
311
While they cannot fully displace Piper's unhelpful call to give less def-
erence to foreign plaintiffs' choice of forum, judges can still ask defen-
dants to point with some specificity to the evidence, witnesses, or
third-party defendants the defendants cannot reach through U.S. pro-
cess that they could (at least theoretically) obtain in a foreign court.
312
Vague assertions of difficulty should not be sufficient, particularly
given the greater ease of gathering foreign evidence today.
313 If
invoking the need for compulsory process, for example, defendants
should be able to identify at least one material unwilling witness who
is likely beyond the U.S. court's personal jurisdiction and the reach of
the Evidence Convention.314 Courts should also be skeptical of
motions brought by U.S. defendants, particularly those sued in their
home districts.315
310 Cf. Richard M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104 GEo. L.J.
921, 951-56 (2016) (identifying how lower courts can narrow obsolete Supreme Court
precedent in order to update it).
311 This is what the language of Gilbert and Piper would seem to require, though as I
have argued elsewhere, that presumption has become weaker over time. See Gardner,
supra note 47, at 993-94.
312 While the Supreme Court warned against requiring defendants to submit detailed
affidavits identifying specific witnesses, see Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 258
(1981), this more basic showing should not require "extensive investigation" in advance, id.
313 See, e.g., Reid-Walen v. Hansen, 933 F.2d 1390, 1397 (8th Cir. 1991) (emphasizing
how travel and communication developments since 1947 have reduced inconveniences for
defendants); Gates Learjet Corp. v. Jensen, 743 F.2d 1325, 1336 (9th Cir. 1984) (same).
314 See, e.g., DiFederico v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 714 F.3d 796, 806-07 (4th Cir. 2013)
(refusing to give this factor weight "when the defendant has not shown that any witness is
actually unwilling to testify"); Carijano v. Occidental Petrol. Corp., 643 F.3d 1216, 1231
(9th Cir. 2011) (collecting cases to similar effect); see also supra notes 119-28 and
accompanying text (discussing the Evidence Convention). Given that courts have not
consistently considered the Evidence Convention in evaluating the availability of foreign
witnesses, see, e.g., Alpine Atl. Asset Mgmt. AG v. Comstock, 552 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1281
(D. Kan. 2008) (stressing that a U.S. court would be unable to compel unwilling Swiss and
U.K. citizens to testify without noting that both countries are parties to the Evidence
Convention), plaintiffs may wish to bring the convention to the court's attention when
appropriate.
315 See Gschwind v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 161 F.3d 602, 609 (10th Cir. 1998) (asserting
that a "forum resident should have to make a stronger case than others for dismissal based
on forum non conveniens"); Reid-Walen, 933 F.2d at 1395 ("[W]here the forum resident
seeks dismissal, this fact should weigh strongly against dismissal."); see also Galustian v.
Peter, 591 F.3d 724, 732 (4th Cir. 2010) (raising same observation in dicta).
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Second, judges can take seriously plaintiffs' concerns about how
the change in forum will affect their own access to evidence, witnesses,
and joinder. Even though courts at times acknowledge that transna-
tional cases can be difficult to litigate in any forum,316 it is still hard
for U.S. judges to evaluate whether the foreign court applying its own
procedures will in fact have greater access to evidence or a greater
ability to try the case efficiently. Judges have thus relied on defen-
dants' stipulations that they will provide, for example, U.S.-style dis-
covery to plaintiffs in the alternative (foreign) forum,317 but it is
uncertain whether such stipulations are enforceable.318
Instead of relying on stipulations, courts should explicitly con-
sider plaintiffs' interests within the analysis of private interests. Some
circuits have suggested that judges should take plaintiffs' interests into
account,319 but it is not always clear whether such considerations are
to be weighed within the existing private interest factors, as a new
private interest factor, as part of the adequate alternative forum
316 See, e.g., Bos. Telecomms. Grp., Inc. v. Wood, 588 F.3d 1201, 1210 (9th Cir. 2009)
("This is a case in which witnesses are scattered around the globe. Whether the case is tried
in Slovakia or California, both parties will likely be forced to depend on deposition
testimony in lieu of live testimony for at least some witnesses."); Baxter Int'l Inc. v. AXA
Versicherung AG, 908 F. Supp. 2d 920, 926 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (recognizing that one party or
the other would have to travel under either scenario); Klyszcz v. Cloward H20 LLC, No.
11-23023-Civ., 2012 WL 4468345, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 26, 2012) (similar); In re Air Crash
at Madrid, Spain, on Aug. 20, 2008, 893 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1033 (C.D. Cal. 2011) ("[N]o
matter where these suits are tried, one side will face difficulty in gathering evidence and
presenting witnesses for its case .... In either situation, the out-of-country evidence will be
central to one party's case."); Bohn v. Bartels, 620 F. Supp. 2d 418, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
("Regardless of where this case is tried, it likely will be inconvenient and costly for those
involved.").
317 See, e.g., Tazoe v. Airbus S.A.S., 631 F.3d 1321, 1330 (11th Cir. 2011); Giglio Sub
S.N.C. v. Carnival Corp., 2012 A.M.C. 2705, 2734 (S.D. Fla. 2012).
318 See Main, supra note 183, at 479; see also Effron, supra note 214, at 710 ("Try as they
might, however, judges cannot use conditional dismissals to transform forum non
conveniens dismissals into a de facto system of international transfer.").
319 Some circuits have focused on practical impediments for plaintiffs, like the lack of a
contingent fee system in the alternate forum, see, e.g., Reid-Walen, 933 F.2d at 1399, or the
financial burden that foreign litigation would impose on "impecunious plaintiffs," Wiwa v.
Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 226 F.3d 88, 108 n.13 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding error in the
magistrate judge's "focusing his consideration of the convenience factors almost entirely
on the convenience of the defendants"); see also Iragorri v. Int'l Elevator, Inc., 203 F.3d 8,
17 (1st Cir. 2000) (noting that the relative financial resources of the parties might be taken
into consideration); Rivendell Forest Prods., Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ltd., 2 F.3d 990, 994 n.7
(10th Cir. 1993) (same). Others have focused on the emotional trauma or safety concerns
for plaintiffs litigating before a particular foreign forum. See DiFederico, 714 F.3d at 805
("[I]t would be a perversion of justice to force a widow and her children to place
themselves in the same risk-laden situation that led to the death of a family member.");
Guidi v. Inter-Cont'l Hotels Corp., 224 F.3d 142, 147 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing, in declining to
dismiss case, "the substantial and unusual emotional burden on [p]laintiffs" in traveling to
the country of the terrorist attack that gave rise to their claims).
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inquiry, or as an overarching gestalt assessment.320 It turns out that
this choice matters. If the judge considers the plaintiffs' interests as
part of the adequate alternative forum inquiry, for example, the plain-
tiffs' interests will rarely overcome that inquiry's high bar. In fact, the
decision to site plaintiffs' interests within the adequate alternative
forum inquiry or within the private interest analysis can explain how
judges have reached seemingly inconsistent conclusions about
whether it is too dangerous or emotionally fraught to send plaintiffs to
litigate in Pakistan,321 in Egypt,322 and in Cali, Colombia.323 If judges
wish to consider plaintiffs' interests as part of the forum non con-
veniens analysis, then, they should do so within the balancing of pri-
vate interests.
Third, the public interest factors should be applied literally and
narrowly; the existing factors are not the place to attempt the
weighing of generic state interests.324 If a case is truly localized in
another country, with few or no ties to the United States, or if the
dispute is a high profile case that "touch[es] the affairs of many per-
320 The Fourth Circuit has "decline[d] to categorize [plaintiffs' interests] within any one
factor and instead treat[ed] it as a general consideration of convenience." DiFederico, 714
F.3d at 804 n.7 (recognizing that the plaintiffs' safety concerns could be analyzed as part of
the available alternative forum inquiry, under specific private interest factors, or as a
separate private interest factor). The Ninth Circuit has instead added two private interest
factors to the standard list: "the residence of the parties and the witnesses" and "the
forum's convenience to the litigants." Lueck v. Sundstrand Corp., 236 F.3d 1137, 1145 (9th
Cir. 2001). The Second Circuit has characterized the entire private interest analysis as "a
comparison between the hardships defendant would suffer through the retention of
jurisdiction and the hardships the plaintiff would suffer as the result of dismissal and the
obligation to bring suit in another country." Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 74
(2d Cir. 2001). Meanwhile, the Eleventh Circuit has declined to recognize any plaintiff-
specific factor at all. See Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 578 F.3d 1283,
1295 (11th Cir. 2009) (declining to recognize a plaintiff-specific factor to account for
plaintiffs' safety concerns in attending trial in the alternative forum).
321 Compare Harp v. Airblue Ltd., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1075 (C.D. Cal. 2012)
(rejecting plaintiff's concerns about terrorism and kidnapping directed against U.S. citizens
in Pakistan in holding that Pakistan was an adequate alternative forum), with DiFederico,
714 F.3d at 804 & nn.7-8 (accepting the same State Department warnings of terrorism in
Pakistan as showing that the balance of private interest factors favored plaintiffs' choice of
U.S. forum).
322 Compare Niv v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 710 F. Supp. 2d 328, 336-37, 347 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) (rejecting the safety and emotional trauma concerns of foreign survivors of a
terrorist attack in Egypt in dismissing their case based on Egypt being an adequate
alternative forum), with Guidi, 224 F.3d at 147 (giving weight in the private interest
analysis to the safety and emotional trauma concerns of U.S. survivors of a terrorist attack
in Egypt when declining to dismiss the case).
323 Compare Iragorri v. Int'l Elevator, Inc., 203 F.3d at 13 (affirming the district court's
finding that Cali, Colombia, was an adequate alternative forum despite plaintiffs' safety
concerns), with Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp., 274 F.3d at 75 (remanding for further
consideration of the same plaintiffs' fears about returning to Cali).
324 See supra Section II.B.
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sons"325 in another country, that might weigh heavily in favor of
declining jurisdiction-at least unless Congress has specifically
expressed an interest in adjudicating such cases. But for the many
cases where the United States has some connection to or interest in
the dispute, the "local interest" factors should be treated as largely
irrelevant.
Similarly, the choice-of-laws factor should be interpreted nar-
rowly so as to avoid undermining the positive prescriptive comity
interest in applying foreign law when appropriate. Specifically, the
choice-of-laws factor should primarily be invoked when it is clear that
U.S. law will apply, in which case it should weigh heavily (if not pre-
sumptively) in favor of retaining jurisdiction.326 On the other hand,
the applicability of foreign law should not be a reason to dismiss a
case otherwise properly in a U.S. court. Finally, judges should down-
play or ignore entirely Gilbert's docket congestion factor.327 That
factor reflects Gilbert's concern about the distribution of workload
within a single judicial system, a concern that does not translate to the
transnational context. Besides which, comparing docket congestion
across court systems is a much more difficult inquiry.328 And even if it
were feasible, commenting on the workflow or capacity of foreign
courts carries too much risk of condescension or error, which has led
some courts to wisely refuse to take the factor into account.
329
Fourth, courts can also talk about the doctrine differently, even if
they cannot change the name. The question should not be one of mun-
325 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 509 (1947).
326 This is the approach taken, for example, by the Tenth Circuit. See Yavuz v. 61 MM,
Ltd., 576 F.3d 1166, 1178 (10th Cir. 2009) ("If domestic law is applicable to the case, the
forum non conveniens doctrine is inapplicable.").
327 Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508 (considering the "difficulties [that] follow for courts when
litigation is piled up in congested centers instead of being handled at its origin").
328 See, e.g., Davies, supra note 23, at 374-75.
329 See, e.g., Guidi v. Inter-Cont'l Hotels Corp., 224 F.3d 142, 146 n.5 (2d Cir. 2000)
("[T]he recent filling of all judicial vacancies and the resulting full complement of judges
for the District makes this concern of little or no present significance."); Gates Learjet
Corp. v. Jensen, 743 F.2d 1325, 1337 (9th Cir. 1984) ("The forum non conveniens doctrine
should not be used as a solution to court congestion .... "); Logan Int'l Inc. v.
SureTech Completions (USA), Inc., No. 4:13-cv-00492, 2013 WL 3005592, at *5 (S.D. Tex.
June 10, 2013) ("[A]ll courts are busy.").
Some courts have instead reoriented the factor towards private interests, asking if the
case would proceed more quickly to trial in one forum or the other. See, e.g., In re Factor
VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Prods. Litig., 484 F.3d 951, 958 (7th Cir. 2007); Gates
Learjet, 743 F.2d at 1337. That solution eases the tenor problem but introduces a
methodological one: It is hard for judges to evaluate correctly (and diplomatically) the
pace of litigation in foreign courts. See Abad v. Bayer Corp., 563 F.3d 663, 672 (7th Cir.
2009) (rejecting evidence of delay in Argentine courts because the evidence of delay was
outdated). The better approach may be to ignore the factor entirely.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 92:390
RETIRING FORUM NON CONVENIENS
dane inconvenience but of real unfairness.330 Shifts in tone and lan-
guage might help over time to limit forum non conveniens to the rare,
rather than the median, case.
B. Reducing Reliance
Even if doctrinal reforms are slow or uneven, judges can also help
ease forum non conveniens into retirement simply by reducing reli-
ance upon it. In particular, trial court judges can avoid applying forum
non conveniens in the first place if other threshold inquiries already
point to a case's dismissal.331 Indeed, as a practical matter-given the
recent Supreme Court developments canvassed in Part III-these
other threshold inquiries may now be easier to assess than forum non
conveniens. Alternatively, defendants may become more cautious
about invoking forum non conveniens after some high-profile cases
that were dismissed from U.S. courts were in fact refiled in foreign
courts, resulting in generous plaintiff judgments.332 That is, as foreign
courts become more receptive to U.S.-style litigation, the forum shop-
ping calculus of defendants (especially U.S. defendants) may shift
away from automatic invocation of forum non conveniens.333
The Supreme Court might follow suit in its own way. A demy-
thologized forum non conveniens lacks the history or the breadth to
serve as a "get out of jail free" card for resolving (or avoiding) doc-
trinal conundrums. In turn, the Court's analyses should be more thor-
ough or else its decisions more limited, both of which outcomes would
be conducive to the reasoned elaboration needed to build interdoc-
trinal coherence. By treating forum non conveniens as a doctrine of
last resort, the courts and the Court can encourage the development
of other doctrines that might, in turn, further displace any remaining
need for forum non conveniens.
330 See Clermont, supra note 248, at 119 ("Forum non conveniens should not expand
into a doctrine of inconvenience, but instead should be a doctrine of abuse. The courts
should dismiss a suit only when the plaintiff has so abused the privilege of forum selection
that, all things considered, exercising jurisdiction would be a miscarriage of justice.").
331 Although courts may dismiss for forum non conveniens before considering other
threshold inquiries, Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malay. Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 425
(2007), they are not required to do so.
332 In addition to the DBCP litigation described in the introduction, the enormous
Ecuadorian verdict against Chevron in the Lago Agrio litigation-and Chevron's legal
costs to block enforcement of that judgment-has garnered much attention. See, e.g.,
Manuel A. G6mez, The Global Chase: Seeking the Recognition and Enforcement of the
Lago Agrio Judgment Outside of Ecuador, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 429, 430-33 (2013)
(describing the Lago Agrio litigation).
333 See Bookman, supra note 22, at 1124-27.
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Consider, for example, the Court's 2007 decision in Sinochem
International Co. v. Malaysia International Shipping Corp. ,334 where
the Court held that district courts "may dispose of an action by a
forum non conveniens dismissal, bypassing questions of subject-matter
and personal jurisdiction, when considerations of convenience, fair-
ness, and judicial economy so warrant.' 335 That decision was not
incorrect either doctrinally or pragmatically.3 36 Sinochem was-as the
Supreme Court acknowledged-"a textbook case for immediate
forum non conveniens dismissal,' 337 which made forum non con-
veniens the most straightforward basis for resolving the case. But what
made it an easy case also made it a missed opportunity to develop
other, more helpful inquiries. First, it was a foreign-cubed admiralty
case and thus a good vehicle for rejuvenating a separate admiralty
doctrine focused more explicitly on comity.338 Second, there were par-
allel proceedings already underway in China,339 which meant the case
could have been stayed pending resolution of those proceedings under
a doctrine of lis alibi pendens. Either would have been a more narrow
(and equally straightforward) ground for dismissing that suit; indeed,
these are just two examples of alternative inquiries the courts should
be developing.
C. Developing Alternatives
The doctrinal developments traced in Part III have reduced the
need for forum non conveniens, but additional developments would
further obsolete any remaining purpose. Sinochem points to two sig-
nificant possibilities: First, the courts could resurrect a separate doc-
trine of forum non conveniens specifically for use in admiralty
cases.340 Such a doctrine would be limited to cases involving foreign
litigants, and it would be focused on balancing positive and negative
aspects of adjudicative comity. Second, the Supreme Court could
articulate a set of standards for managing the problem of lis alibi
pendens, or parallel proceedings in foreign forums involving the same
334 549 U.S. 422 (2007).
335 Id. at 432.
336 If the Court were willing to reverse Sinochem, however, that would help further
marginalize forum non conveniens while promoting the development of other inquiries, an
insight for which I thank Professor Pamela Bookman.
337 Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 435.
338 See supra text accompanying notes 96-106.
339 Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 426-27.
340 This move may require revisiting American Dredging's holding that there is no
admiralty-specific doctrine of forum non conveniens. See Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510
U.S. 443, 449-50 (1994).
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parties and issues.341 Parallel proceedings raise concerns about effi-
ciency and comity, particularly the waste of judicial resources when a
foreign court is already expending resources on a case.342 Civil law
countries address this problem through lis alibi pendens, under which
they typically stay second-filed cases pending resolution in the first-
filed forum.343 In contrast, the federal courts do not currently have a
distinct doctrine for handling foreign parallel litigation.
344
Though the lower courts at times have invoked the concept of lis
alibi pendens, they have treated it primarily as an extension of
domestic abstention doctrines.345 But domestic abstention doctrines
do not translate well to the transnational context as they are based on
federalism concerns, not international comity.346 While a few courts
have instead invoked "international comity abstention" to address
parallel proceedings, international comity abstention is more a label
than a doctrine-it is so undertheorized that no one really knows what
341 See Calamita, supra note 9, at 603 (noting that "[t]he treatment of international
parallel proceedings remains one of the most unsettled areas of the law of federal
jurisdiction in the United States" and that "the Supreme Court has never spoken to the
appropriate framework to be employed"); Austen L. Parrish, Duplicative Foreign
Litigation, 78 Gao. WASH. L. REv. 237, 241 (2010) (similar).
342 See, e.g., Calamita, supra note 9, at 610-11 (noting the lack of any benefit that would
offset the significant costs and concerns attendant to parallel proceedings).
343 CHASE ET AL., supra note 233, at 530; see also Brand, supra note 20, at 1008-11
(comparing common law and civil law approaches to parallel litigation); Ralf Michaels,
Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1003, 1008 (2006) (similar). For a
cogent and nuanced account of different approaches to the problem of parallel
proceedings, see generally CAMPBELL McLACHLAN, Lis PENDENS IN INTERNATIONAL
LITIGATION (2009).
344 See Burbank, supra note 122, at 638-39 (excoriating the Court for failing to address
this gap).
345 See McLACHLAN, supra note 343, at 102-11 ("[T]he approach to international cases
has been fashioned by [federal] judges by analogy from the principles of internal civil
procedure."); Calamita, supra note 9, at 613-14 (discussing the lower courts' invocation of
Colorado River and Landis in order to address foreign parallel proceedings); Parrish,
supra note 341, at 247-51 (same).
346 See Calamita, supra note 9, at 656-62 (discussing the theoretical dissonance resulting
from reliance on federal-state abstention doctrines); Parrish, supra note 341, at 242
(asserting that "much of the existing analysis of foreign parallel proceedings is drawn from
domestic theory, without any serious consideration as to whether the domestic can be so
easily grafted onto the international, or whether the two situations are comparable at all").
And even if the rationales were comparable, these federal-state abstention doctrines would
still not serve as useful models to the extent that they are incoherent on their own terms.
See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 82, at 215, 232.
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it means.347 Indeed, that undertheorization makes it equally suscep-
tible to parochial distortion.
348
Forum non conveniens may seem capacious enough to be able to
fill this void349-but it is not the right vehicle for this analysis. For one
thing, forum non conveniens approaches the question from the wrong
direction: It starts with the presumption (at least nominally) that the
court should exercise its jurisdiction, but the starting presumption of a
lis alibi pendens inquiry is typically that a court should not exercise its
jurisdiction if proceedings are already underway elsewhere.350 In addi-
tion, the Gilbert test does not already incorporate consideration of
parallel proceedings, and for the reasons I outlined above,351 adding
such an additional consideration is unlikely to work. It would require
a new factor, the weight of which might differ from the other factors,
adding complexity while fighting against thirty-five years of habitual
application of the existing Gilbert test in transnational cases. Simply
put, "it is probably too late in the day" to add such a consideration
and expect courts to reliably "draw the kind of distinctions in anal-
ysis" that would be required.352
The exact contours of what a new doctrine of lis alibi pendens
would entail are beyond the scope of this Article, but it bears noting
that such a doctrine would not necessarily require the continued use
of forum non conveniens.353 In particular, the new doctrine (whether
legislated or judge made) could include exceptions geared to keeping
in check the dreaded "race to the courthouse" of a strict first-filed
rule. For example, the strong presumption that courts should stay
347 See, e.g., Bookman, supra note 22, at 1096-97 (describing international comity as "a
sort of intercourt diplomacy" that "can mean practically anything or nothing"); Calamita,
supra note 9, at 667 (similar); Parrish, supra note 341, at 260; Silberman, supra note 56, at
340-41; see also Dodge, supra note 9, at 2112-14 (giving examples of the various and
unpredictable results of its invocation).
348 A full exploration of what courts might mean by international comity abstention-
and the risk such a broad and undertheorized doctrine poses for transnational litigation-
must, however, be saved for another day.
349 See McLACHLAN, supra note 343, at 146 (noting that consideration of parallel
proceedings is often subsumed within the analysis of forum non conveniens).
350 See Calamita, supra note 9, at 672-73; Parrish, supra note 341, at 270-72; see also
Calamita, supra note 9, at 651 (noting that all state courts that have addressed this question
have treated forum non conveniens separately from lis alibi pendens because the initial
presumption would need to be reversed).
351 See supra Section H.A.
352 Calamita, supra note 9, at 672.
353 While others have assumed that lis alibi pendens requires continued use of forum
non conveniens, those proposals are functionally similar to this approach. See Burbank,
supra note 82, at 230 & n.132 (suggesting codified exceptions within a lis alibi pendens
statute); Calamita, supra note 9, at 677-78 (suggesting forum non conveniens be used
where a first-filed case is not brought by the natural plaintiff).
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cases when there is parallel litigation abroad might be overcome if the
foreign case was not brought by the natural plaintiff, or if the foreign
proceeding has been significantly delayed, or if the foreign court is
unable to provide the plaintiff with a fair trial or a meaningful remedy.
That is, lis alibi pendens need not be a strict rule that requires the
mediating influence of a separate, more flexible standard like forum
non conveniens; it could instead incorporate some standard-like
inquiries within its more rule-like structure.
Another significant alternative to forum non conveniens waiting
to be developed is a more appropriate vehicle for enforcing forum
selection clauses. Currently, based on the Supreme Court's strong
dicta, the federal district courts are using forum non conveniens to
enforce these clauses in transnational cases, which obscures the lack of
legislative authority for that policy.354 If Congress were to ratify and
implement the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements,
the federal courts would have a more legitimate basis-and better
procedural vehicle-for enforcing forum selection clauses in transna-
tional cases. At the same time, one of the few remaining (albeit ques-
tionable) uses of forum non conveniens would also be obviated.
In short, forum non conveniens is not an all-encompassing cure-
all for any problem that arises in transnational litigation. Demytholo-
gizing forum non conveniens can instead help us to see more clearly
what needs fixing in the first place.
D. Narrowing Application
Either Congress or the Court could also affirmatively pare back
the application of forum non conveniens, limiting its use to narrower
categories of cases. In particular, neither history nor comity nor due
process justify the use of forum non conveniens to dismiss cases
brought against U.S. defendants.35 5 Indeed, allies are unlikely to see
U.S. courts exercising their jurisdiction over U.S. defendants as any
sort of impingement on the allies' sovereign prerogatives. To the con-
trary, in civil law jurisdictions, a plaintiff must traditionally go to the
defendant's forum to pursue an action, regardless of where the cause
of action arose; thus, for example, the defendant's domicile is the pre-
sumptively preferred forum under the European Union's Brussels
regime.356 The defendant's home forum being the proper place for
suit, or at least a fair forum for the defendant, is embedded within the
U.S. system as well. Under the federal removal statute, after all,
354 See supra text accompanying notes 291-94.
355 See supra Section I.D.
356 See, e.g., Clermont, supra note 248, at 91-92.
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defendants cannot remove cases filed in the courts of the home state
of any properly served defendant.357 Or consider the Supreme Court's
recent promise that Daimler's constriction of general jurisdiction still
ensures "plaintiffs recourse to at least one clear and certain forum in
which a corporate defendant may be sued on any and all claims.
''358 If
Congress were to codify a narrowed doctrine of forum non con-
veniens, then, it should be limited to cases involving non-local
defendants.
359
Further, either Congress or the Court could clarify that forum
non conveniens is not applicable in federal question cases. When juris-
diction is based on a federal statute (28 U.S.C. § 1331) directing the
courts to hear cases arising under other federal statutes, the separa-
tion-of-powers concerns raised by abstention doctrines are at their
zenith.3
60
Even if it appears unlikely that the Supreme Court would
abandon forum non conveniens entirely in the short term, this sort of
retrenchment would in fact be in keeping with broader trends at the
Court. The Court is growing warier of abstention and prudential doc-
trines361-that is, of doctrines that are exceptions to the "strict duty to
exercise the jurisdiction that is conferred upon [the federal courts] by
Congress.' '362 Such reasoning would seem to extend to forum non con-
veniens. But in Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co.,363 an early
instantiation of the trend, the Court distinguished forum non con-
veniens from other abstention doctrines in part because of its "distinct
357 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) (2012). My thanks to Professor John Coyle for this insight.
358 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014).
359 It would be harder for the Supreme Court to do so, given that Piper involved two
U.S. defendants, one of which was at home in the district of the federal court that
dismissed the case for forum non conveniens.
360 Cf. Burbank, supra note 34, at 399-400 (arguing forum non conveniens hould not
be applied in statutory cases because it undermines domestic regulatory interests); Lear,
supra note 27, at 1164 ("Each time a court dismisses a case on forum non conveniens
grounds, it displaces the congressional value judgment that the dispute may coveniently be
heard by the federal courts."). On the constitutional concerns potentially raised by
abstention doctrines, see generally Redish, supra note 35.
361 See The Supreme Court, 2013 Term - Leading Cases, 128 HARV. L. REV. 191,
326-30 (2014) (noting the Court's growing "discomfort with prudential justiciability
doctrines and [its] effort to bring greater discipline to jurisdictional rulings" as illustrated
by cases like Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014)
(standing); Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334 (2014) (ripeness); and Sprint
Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584 (2013) (abstention)); see also John F. Manning,
The Supreme Court, 2013 Term - Foreword: The Means of Constitutional Power, 128
HARV. L. REV. 1, 73 n.415 (2014). For a more critical view of this trend, see Fred 0. Smith,
Jr., Undemocratic Restraint, 70 VAND. L. REV. 845 (2017).
362 Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996).
363 Id.
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historical pedigree.' 364 Yet those roots are not nearly as deep nor as
distinct as the Quackenbush Court seemed to assume. Quackenbush's
holding that courts should not apply Burford abstention365 to dismiss
or remand cases seeking legal remedies366 in fact undermined what
limited pedigree forum non conveniens can claim in federal practice.
When the Gilbert Court adopted forum non conveniens in 1947, it
pointed to Burford to suggest that courts do have the discretion to
dismiss cases at law.367 That reliance mattered because the Gilbert
Court labored hard to justify the application of forum non conveniens
outside of equity and admiralty. A demythologized forum non con-
veniens casts serious doubt on the distinction drawn in Quackenbush
between Burford abstention and forum non conveniens; if the courts'
power under one is rightly circumscribed, so should it be under the
other.
Relatedly, the Court seems increasingly skeptical of prudential
arguments about the judiciary's inability to adjudicate cases touching
on foreign relations.368 Those standard prudential arguments, perhaps
because they are so easy to invoke, helped abstention-type doctrines
to grow in foreign relations law over the course of the twentieth cen-
tury.369 That growth in the discretion to avoid foreign relations cases
was, in a way, a growth in judicial power, even though cloaked in the
language of judicial deference.370 The Court has now reined some of
364 Id. at 722.
365 Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
366 See Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 730-31 (holding that courts can only dismiss or
remand cases under Burford "where the relief being sought is equitable or otherwise
discretionary").
367 See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 505 (1947) (discussing Burford as resting
"[o]n substantially forum non conveniens grounds").
368 See Harlan Grant Cohen, Formalism and Distrust: Foreign Affairs Law in the
Roberts Court, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 380, 384-87 (2015) (describing how "the Roberts
Court has jettisoned its traditional functionalism in favor of formalism" in foreign affairs
cases).
369 See Goldsmith, supra note 196, at 1400-10 (describing the growth of functional
abstention doctrines during the Cold War); see also id. at 1414-15 (questioning the ability
of courts to apply such doctrines in a disciplined manner).
370 See id. at 1396; Tara Leigh Grove, The Lost History of the Political Question
Doctrine, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1908, 1959-73 (2015); cf. Cohen, supra note 368, at 436
(describing the Court's apparent worry that "[f]oreign affairs functionalism,... like the
keys to the family car or no curfew, might just be too much of a temptation"); Koh, supra
note 216, at 2356-58, 2362-64, 2377, 2382 (criticizing the blanket invocation of comity,
separation of powers, and judicial incompetence rationales as excusing judicial abdication
in transnational cases). There are echoes here, of course, of Professor Martin Redish's
critique of abstention doctrines as "judicial usurpation of legislative authority." Redish,
supra note 35, at 76; see also Marshall, supra note 35, at 898 (noting that Redish's article
succeeded in revealing abstention to be a form of judicial activism rather than judicial
restraint).
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those doctrines back in, encouraging judges to retain and resolve more
cases even if they implicate the political interests of other countries.371
In particular, the Court has tightened the act of state doctrine372 from
"a sort of balancing approach" that considered broad-ranging pruden-
tial concerns into a narrow, rule-like threshold determination of
whether the case turns on the validity of an "official action by a for-
eign sovereign.'373 More recently, the Court has signaled that the
political question doctrine374 is but "a narrow exception" to the judi-
ciary's "responsibility to decide cases properly before it. ''37 5 In doing
so, it cast doubt on the continuing validity of the doctrine's more pru-
dential factors, like "the potentiality of embarrassment" from many
voices addressing one question.376
Given the interconnectedness of today's world, where the lines
between here and there and public and private are blurred, foreign
sovereign interests could plausibly be implicated in almost all transna-
tional cases,377 and not every case touching on foreign relations, for-
eign interests, or foreign law can be off limits. Yet forum non
conveniens asks judges to broadly consider sovereign interests and
371 Cf David H. Moore, Beyond One Voice, 98 MINN. L. REV. 953, 1017-32, 1041-44
(2014) (critiquing functionalist justifications of judicial abdication in foreign relations cases
based on the need for the United States to speak with one voice); Ganesh Sitaraman &
Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, 128 HARV. L. REv. 1897,
1935-49 (2015) (questioning functionalist rationales for foreign affairs exceptionalism).
372 "The act of state doctrine provides, in broad outline, that U.S. courts will not sit in
judgment on the validity of the public acts of foreign sovereigns within their own
territory." BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 14, at 797.
373 W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int'l, 493 U.S. 400, 406, 408-09
(1990). "Courts in the United States have the power, and ordinarily the obligation, to
decide cases and controversies properly presented to them," Justice Scalia wrote for the
unanimous Court. Id. at 409. "The act of state doctrine does not establish an exception for
cases and controversies that may embarrass foreign governments, but merely requires that,
in the process of deciding, the acts of foreign sovereigns taken within their own
jurisdictions shall be deemed valid." Id.
374 The political question doctrine "bars federal courts from resolving cases that raise
issues more appropriately committed to other branches of government." BORN &
RUTLEDGE, supra note 14, at 20.
375 Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton (Zivotofsky 1), 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1427 (2012).
376 See id. at 1427 (citing only the first two factors of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217
(1962)); see also id. at 1431-34 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (describing the last three Baker factors, omitted by the majority, as addressing
prudential concerns). It is not clear, however, if the lower courts have heeded this signal.
See Alex Loomis, Why Are the Lower Courts (Mostly) Ignoring Zivotofsky I's Political
Question Analysis?, LAWFARE (May 19, 2016, 4:23 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-
are-lower-courts-mostly-ignoring-zivotofsky-political-question-analysis (suggesting that
district courts have continued to apply all of the Baker factors notwithstanding Zivotofsky
I).
377 Cf Cohen, supra note 368, at 389 (describing the ubiquity of foreign elements in
cases); Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 371, at 1942-43 (describing the ubiquity of
transnational connections).
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comity implications-precisely the type of general inquiry that invites
judges to assert incompetence, embarrassment, or political delicacy as
a reason for avoiding cases. Both descriptively and normatively, that is
the wrong direction for the federal courts to be heading.
E. Harmonization Through Legislation
The most promising route for finally retiring forum non con-
veniens, however, would be through a new private law treaty. The
United States has pushed for a new Hague convention on the recogni-
tion of judgments.378 Such a treaty would ensure the enforceability of
judgments and their res judicata effect across countries, in turn
improving predictability and efficiency for both courts and busi-
nesses.379 That project is ambitious, however, as it also requires agree-
ment on the bases of jurisdiction, the assertion of which would result
in presumptively valid judgments.380 The efforts to establish such a
treaty failed in the early 2000s381 in part because, as Justice Ginsburg
noted in Daimler,382 the United States still continues to assert some
exorbitant bases of jurisdiction that its allies are hesitant to accept
(though to be fair, it is not alone in that regard).383 By distilling gen-
eral jurisdiction into a more rule-like form, the Daimler Court was
self-consciously bringing U.S. practice closer into alignment with
European allies,384  making future harmonization efforts more
plausible.
There is similarly space for reconsidering transient presence
("tag") jurisdiction in transnational cases.385 When it comes to
378 On the strong U.S. interest in such a treaty, see Clermont, supra note 248, at 94.
379 For differing views on the value of harmonization more generally, see, for example,
CHASE ET AL., supra note 233, at 562-78.
380 See Michaels, supra note 343, at 1065-66 (discussing the different preferences of U.S.
and European negotiators regarding the scope of jurisdictional agreement).
381 See Patrick J. Borchers, One Step Forward and Two Back: Missed Opportunities in
Refining the United States Minimum Contacts Test and the European Union Brussels I
Regulation, 31 ARIZ. J. INT'L & CoMip. L. 1, 18 (2014); Michaels, supra note 343, at
1009-10. The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, however, was salvaged
from these failed negotiations. Borchers, supra, at 18.
382 See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 763 (2014) (noting the international
tension caused by exorbitant bases of jurisdiction).
383 See Clermont & Palmer, supra note 219, at 477-81 (noting the exorbitant nature of
transient and attachment jurisdiction under U.S. law); id. at 482-504 (describing exorbitant
bases of jurisdiction in France and other European countries).
384 See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 763 (chiding the Ninth Circuit for failing to consider the
comity implications of its expansive view of general jurisdiction and remarking on the
narrower view taken by other nations).
385 See, e.g., Clermont, supra note 248, at 111-12 (noting that to achieve agreement on a
judgments treaty, the United States would likely have to abandon transient jurisdiction);
John T. Parry, Rethinking Personal Jurisdiction After Bauman and Walden, 19 LEwis &
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asserting jurisdiction over foreign defendants based on their tempo-
rary physical presence,386 justifications based on either history or fair-
ness are at their lowest ebb.387 Eliminating or at least narrowing tag
jurisdiction over foreign defendants would further help harmonize
U.S. procedure with that of major trading partners;3a8 it would also
have the added benefit of reducing one of the few remaining needs for
forum non conveniens as a safety valve for unfair applications of tag
jurisdiction.
389
Meanwhile, negotiations for a judgments treaty have resumed in
The Hague.390 That effort has not yet revisited the question of juris-
diction, but when it does, the issue of forum non conveniens will
surely arise again. Only a handful of other common law countries rec-
ognize such a doctrine, and "the trend internationally has been to jet-
tison the doctrine altogether.' 391 Last time around, negotiators were
able to reach a tentative compromise on a narrowed version of forum
non conveniens that reflects many of the design criteria I have argued
for here.392 First, it would set a strong default in favor of exercising
jurisdiction, limiting forum non conveniens to "exceptional circum-
stances" and ending the use of Piper's different treatment of foreign
plaintiffs' choice of forum.393 Second, it would drop all the public
interest factors currently cited by the federal courts, relying instead on
the political decisions embodied in the convention itself as the appro-
priate balance of comity and administrative concerns. Third, it would
turn the private interest factors into a comparative analysis that com-
pares plaintiffs' and defendants' interests as well as the two forums'
CLARK L. REV. 607, 614-15 (2015) (suggesting Daimler may open space to reconsider the
presumptive validity of tag jurisdiction).
386 Specifically individual defendants, as corporations are not subject to transitory
process. See, e.g., Clermont & Palmer, supra note 219, at 478.
387 See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 610-19 (1990) (Scalia, J.) (plurality
opinion) (emphasizing the historical tradition of transient jurisdiction); id. at 629-32
(Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasizing the fairness of the practice of
transient jurisdiction).
388 See, e.g., Clermont & Palmer, supra note 219, at 478 & n.20 (noting that allies view
the U.S. practice of tag jurisdiction as an exorbitant basis of jurisdiction).
389 See, e.g., Burnham, 495 U.S. at 639 & n.13 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment)
(referencing state court use of forum non conveniens as one of several procedural devices
available to ameliorate the unfairness of tag jurisdiction in individual cases); EHRENZWEIG,
supra note 102, at 122 (linking the rise of tag jurisdiction with the rise of forum non
conveniens as a means for checking tag jurisdiction's potential unfairness).
390 See The Judgments Project, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW, https://
www.hcch.net/en/projects/legislative-projects/judgments (last visited Mar. 10, 2017).
391 Rutledge, supra note 19, at 1071; see also Bookman, supra note 22, at 1096 ("Few
other nations recognize forum non conveniens, and those that do tend to permit it more
sparingly.").
392 See Brand, supra note 20, at 1030-34 (quoting interim draft text).
393 See id. at 1032-33.
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relative ability to obtain the needed evidence. That comparative
approach is a better fit for the transnational context, and its specific
and ascertainable bases of comparison provide clearer and more real-
istic guidance for judges, both of which should help alleviate parochial
pressures.
Such a compromise, even if it retains some narrowed existence
for forum non conveniens, would thus alleviate many of the concerns
raised in this Article. As part of a negotiated treaty, its invocation
should enhance-or at least not undermine-international comity,
particularly if judges hew closely to the convention's strong default
presumption in favor of exercising jurisdiction. The broader context of
the convention should also ensure that such dismissals do not result in
access-to-justice gaps, as the convention's structure would guarantee
the availability of another forum as well as the enforceability of any
resulting judgment. And it would turn (what remains of) forum non
conveniens into a legislated compromise rather than a judge-made
doctrine. That relieves any separation-of-powers concerns and excuses
the modern doctrine's limited historical pedigree. It would also make
it harder to invoke forum non conveniens as a malleable stopgap mea-
sure for other doctrinal shortcomings.
Even better, though, the United States could approach this new
round of negotiations ready to let forum non conveniens go.3 9 4 Nego-
tiating such a treaty has proved a challenge for the United States since
it already has a more generous policy towards enforcing foreign judg-
ments than most of its allies.395 Thus the United States must be willing
to part with some other prerogative in order to encourage its
European allies to increase their willingness to recognize U.S. judg-
ments.396 Forum non conveniens can be that bargaining chip.397 U.S.
courts no longer have a great need for forum non conveniens in trans-
national cases,398 and as Professor Kevin Clermont has noted, the
judgments treaty itself would help further rationalize U.S. jurisdic-
tional doctrines in a manner that would eliminate any need that
remains.399 And if the other routes mapped here have already been
394 See Clermont, supra note 248, at 120 (proposing as much).
395 See id. at 93-94.
396 See Burbank, supra note 122, at 635 (noting the difficult negotiating position of the
United States regarding an enforcement treaty).
397 I thank Professor Paul Dubinsky for this insight.
398 See supra Part III.
399 See Clermont, supra note 248, at 120. While some have argued that a forum non
conveniens-like provision is needed in the judgments treaty to ensure U.S. courts do not
get caught between treaty obligations to exercise jurisdiction and minimal due process
requirements under the Constitution, see Burbank, supra note 82, at 237, a better
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pursued, letting go of forum non conveniens when the time is right
will be all the easier.
CONCLUSION
However quickly or slowly forum non conveniens is retired, there
will still be pressures on judges at times to avoid cases that feel too
complex, too foreign, or too sensitive. Without forum non conveniens,
judges will turn to other doctrines, stretching and possibly distorting
those in turn. That is, with or without forum non conveniens, there
will be times when judges' true motives are masked behind the recita-
tion of doctrines that do not directly address those concerns.
There is no obvious best answer to this paradox. Nonetheless, I
see more benefit in removing forum non conveniens as a doctrine that
legitimates such avoidance. As a broad standard that invites judges to
avoid cases they find potentially problematic, forum non conveniens
does not challenge judges to think through the real sources of their
discomfort, which in turn can encourage the same sort of oversimpli-
fied prudential arguments the Court has rejected in other doctrines.400
The breadth of the standard combined with its double layer of discre-
tion also allows greater scope for distortion of the doctrine over
time.401 A series of more narrowly tailored inquiries, on the other
hand, could provide more helpful frameworks for guiding analysis
while checking the distorting effect of exceptional cases.402 My hope is
that the retirement of forum non conveniens would correlate with the
further refinement of these more narrowly tailored frameworks as
well as the development of additional inquiries, the sum total of which
should do a better job addressing the range of concerns judges might
confront in transnational cases.
Ultimately, the goal is not to limit judicial discretion, but to
channel it to its most effective applications. Generalized prudential
concerns, like the risk of embarrassment or friction in foreign rela-
tions, can encourage too much abdication in transnational cases.
Cabining discretion in threshold questions to second-stage inquiries
reached only in exceptional cases can help counteract that pressure.
Federal judges are often quite capable of handling difficult cases, par-
ticularly when they leverage their discretion to develop pragmatic pro-
alternative might be to negotiate a provision that allows a court to refuse jurisdiction when
its exercise would be constitutionally impermissible, see Clermont, supra note 248, at 121.
400 See supra Section IV.D.
401 See supra Section II.A.
402 See supra Section II.C.
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cedural solutions for handling sensitive or complex matters.40 3 That
sort of problem-solving management is a more constructive use of
judicial discretion in transnational litigation than is the outdated, ill-
fitting, overbroad, increasingly redundant, and doctrinally disruptive
tool of forum non conveniens.
403 Cf Pamela K. Bookman & David L. Noll, Ad Hoc Procedure, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV.
(forthcoming Oct. 2017) (manuscript at 1-3, 6-8) (on file with New York University Law
Review); Shirin Sinnar, National Security Experimentalism in the Courts (June 24, 2016)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (evaluating the procedural experimentation
of federal courts in complex national security cases).
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